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ABSTRACT 
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, triggered a new focus on Department 
of Defense (DoD) capabilities support to civilian authorities during emergencies. 
Hurricane Katrina added to this national attention on the role the Department of Defense 
should play in responding to emergencies. Despite this recognition of the significance of 
military involvement, little has been done to organize a military framework that can 
effectively respond to a no notice domestic incident. This thesis analyzes the current 
context in which DoD capabilities are approved and utilized in a national crisis to 
examine two core issues: (1) under what circumstances can DoD capabilities be better 
leveraged in response to a catastrophic domestic event and (2) what are the strategic 
implications for DoD if they assume a more proactive role in domestic events? Two 
situational vignettes carved out of the National Planning Scenarios are used to 
demonstrate that the DoD validation and approval process for civil support operations is 
slowed by current policy. The study culminates by advocating that DoD reorganize its 
force structure to most efficiently support a military response to a domestic event. It 
recommends a new Civil Support Expeditionary Force framework for Defense Support of 
Civil Authorities. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Since 1950, the federal government has rarely considered natural and non-terror 
human-caused disasters within the United States to be matters of national security that 
required intervention of military forces.  The notable exception was civil defense 
responses in case of a nuclear attack.  The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, 
triggered a new focus on Department of Defense (DoD) capabilities support to civilian 
authorities during emergencies.  In particular, on April 30, 2002, the president signed a 
new Department of Defense Unified Command Plan (UCP). Among other things, the 
UCP established the United States Northern Command (NORTHCOM) to provide 
command and control of the department’s homeland defense efforts and to coordinate 
Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA).1
Hurricane Katrina added to this national attention on the role the Department of 
Defense should play in responding to emergencies.  The White House after action report 
on the federal response to Katrina applauded the military’s role.  The report praised DoD 
as follows:  
DoD — both National Guard and active duty forces — demonstrated that 
along with the Coast Guard it was one of the only federal departments that 
possessed real operational capabilities to translate presidential decisions 
into prompt, effective action on the ground. In addition to possessing 
operational personnel in large numbers that have been trained and 
equipped for their missions, DoD brought robust communications 
infrastructure, logistics, and planning capabilities.2  
The defense community, including NORTHCOM, has also continued to evolve 
and grow into this new mission.  The secretary of defense recommended, and Congress 
 
1 Scott Shepherd and Steve Bowman, “Homeland Security: Establishment and Implementation of the United 
States Northern Command,” CRS Report for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2006): 1, 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RS21322.pdf cited 17 August 2005 (Accessed August 21, 2006).  
2 The White House, Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned (Washington, DC: The 
White House, 2006), 7. 
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approved, a new command position — the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland 
Defense and Americas Security Affairs. Also approved was the elevation of the Joint 
Directorate of Military Support (JDOMS), which approves requests for military support 
to civilian authorities, to flag officer leadership, moving it to the Operations Directorate 
of the Joint Staff.3  
Despite this recognition of the significance of military involvement and initial 
reorganization, however, little has been done to organize a military framework that can 
effectively respond to a no notice domestic incident that rapidly or instantly overwhelms 
local and state governments. The National Strategy for Homeland Security (NSHS) and 
the National Response Plan (NRP) allude to a more active military role in domestic 
response, but current policies that describe situations in which DoD assistance in 
Homeland Security may be required fall short of a military framework that could actually 
support NORTHCOM serving as a Primary Agency in a domestic Homeland Defense 
mission.   Recognition of the military’s success in Katrina also is not unqualified.  The 
federal government’s performance during Katrina proved that the current DoD 
framework to support civil authorities is slow and cumbersome. By the president’s own 
admission, “our government, at all levels, failed that test.”4  The military response to the 
crisis took the better part of a week before it could get communications infrastructure, 
logistics, search and rescue, and planning capabilities into the operational area to begin 
an effective response to save lives and ease human suffering.  
The impacts of the 9/11 attacks and Hurricane Katrina comprise a unique 
opportunity for DoD, through U.S. Northern Command, to assert a leadership role in 
catastrophic response planning and execution.  In September, 2005, Congress began 
weighing whether the U.S. military should be granted broader responsibility and 
authority during catastrophic incident response, perhaps even shifting Lead Federal 
Agency responsibility from the Department of Homeland Security to the Department of 
 
3 Donald F. Thompson, “Terrorism and Domestic Response: Can DoD Help Get it Right?” Joint Force 
Quarterly 40, 1st Quarter 2006, 17, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/editions/i40/i40_forum_03.pdf 
(Accessed July 10, 2007).   
4 White House, “President Discusses Hurricane Relief in Address to the Nation,” Press Release, 
September 15, 2006. 
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Defense (DoD).5   The president also affirmed his view that the military’s unique ability 
to surge massive logistical and operational support in response to a major national crisis 
required greater federal authority for DoD under these circumstances.6  The challenge, 
however, is whether DoD and, especially, NORTHCOM have yet constructed a military 
framework that would effectively and efficiently provide appropriate assistance to and 
through civilian authorities under crisis situations. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
President Bush’s suggestion to Congress that there may be certain types of natural 
disasters or terrorist attacks “so vast and so destructive” that the military may be the only 
institution equipped and trained to respond7 warrants an analysis of those situations and 
DoD’s potential effectiveness.  This thesis analyzes the current context in which DoD 
capabilities are approved and utilized in a national crisis to examine two core issues:  (1) 
under what circumstances can DoD capabilities be better leveraged in response to a 
catastrophic domestic event and (2) what are the strategic implications for DoD if they 
assume a more proactive role in domestic events? 
C. PURPOSE 
This thesis examines existing statutes and policies that authorize the use of 
military forces in domestic incidents. The aim is to begin to identify the foundations of a 
proposed military framework to provide DoD support to civil authorities under specific 
emergency situations. The review also seeks to recommend areas of engagement that 
would significantly increase civil support forces and capabilities.  These areas, for 
instance, include much enhanced interagency cooperation, especially between DHS and  
 
5 Mark Sappenfield, “Military wary of disaster role,” Christian Science Monitor, September 29, 2005.  
6 White House, “President Bush Addresses the Nation on Recovery from Katrina,” Press Release, 
September 9, 2005. 
7 Craig Gordon, “Hurricane Rita: Bush urges larger role for military,” Newsday, September 26, 2005.  
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DoD, and among federal, state, local and private entities.  The thesis also focuses on 
ways in which DoD capabilities may be better understood among the full range of 
homeland security practitioners.8
D. METHODOLOGY 
1. Research Methods 
The primary research methods used in this thesis are a hybrid of content analysis 
and historical research. They are used to analyze current policy, statutes, and regulations 
that govern the use of military forces in the homeland. The analysis is aimed at 
establishing the grounds for policy and operational conclusions and recommendations 
about the organization of DoD structure and use of DoD capabilities in specific domestic 
incidents. 
Content analysis techniques are appropriately suited for this thesis because of the 
extensive and diverse nature of the policy guidance, opinions, and arguments on the use 
of military forces in domestic incidents.  Content analysis is a method of research that 
allows the study of human behavior in an indirect way through leaders’ and others’ 
communications as recorded in textbooks, articles, essays, etc.  It is most often used in 
conjunction with other methods.9 The use of historical research is especially beneficial in 
this thesis because of the considerable number and significance of dated statutes, like the 
Posse Comitatus Act, and the legacy of DoD responses to earlier domestic incidents.  
2. How Methods are Applied to Derive Recommendations 
The design of this study focuses on determining the impact that DoD can have on 
specific domestic incidents if organized differently.  This thesis examines these impacts, 
and potential revisions and consolidation of the DoD directives and national policies that 
 
8 This study is by no means a legal analysis; however, it will, hopefully, spark future legislative 
research by a qualified legal analyst so that future DoD directives and national policies can more clearly 
support the use of military forces in domestic incidents.  
9 Jack R. Frankel and Norman E. Wallen, How to Design and Evaluate Research in Education, 4th ed. 
(St. Louis, MO: McGraw-Hill Higher Education, 2000): 469–470. 
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address the use of military forces in the homeland. Current DoD policy provides the 
criteria of legality, lethality, risk, cost, appropriateness, and readiness for evaluating all 
requests for military assistance by civil authorities.10 This thesis will evaluate these 
criteria and identify key elements of the DoD validation process that are particularly 
important in civil support operations. 
This study will present situational vignettes suited to analyze the context in which 
DoD capabilities are leveraged in a national crisis. The criteria used to direct DoD 
engagement will be examined within various situational vignettes to identify and clarify a 
military structure that would improve DoD’s capabilities to respond to domestic 
incidents.  
E.  THESIS OUTLINE 
This thesis follows a qualitative approach that began in this chapter by 
introducing the subject, presenting the problem and defining the research question, 
research methods, and evaluative criteria used in the subject analysis. 
Chapter II presents an historical review and analysis of how DoD capabilities 
have been used and of situations in which DoD is expected to be an active participant in 
domestic events, according to current national policy and guidance. This chapter will also 
analyze the clarity of current policy guidance for the use of DoD capabilities.  
Chapter III presents two situational vignettes carved from the fifteen National 
Planning Scenarios. These vignettes are best suited to present examples of how the 
current framework of DoD support of civil authorities is engineered to work in response 
to a national crisis situation.  The DoD process of providing support to domestic civilian 
authorities is described within the construct of these vignettes. The vignettes provide a 
simplified example of how a specific DoD capability can be requested in different 
scenarios. They also outline the DoD validation process required to approve the use of 
DoD capabilities. 
 
10 Paul S. Stevens, U.S. Armed Forces and Homeland Defense: The Legal Framework (Washington, 
DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2001): 4–14.  
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Chapter IV uses these vignettes in a different way.  The intent is not to argue in 
favor of placing DoD in lead of the entire federal response, but to define and identify 
situations where the current DoD response framework is flawed. The chapter also 
includes a review of current initiatives aimed at improving DoD response capabilities. 
Finally, Chapter V recommends a framework of DoD support to civilian agencies 
that can best leverage its capabilities and resources for civilian support missions.  The 
chapter provides recommendations on how to implement the recommended framework 
within the construct of national policy and DoD directives to clarify the use of military 
forces in domestic incidents. Even at the end of this analysis, however, a desirable 
framework for support to civilian authorities is not complete.  The thesis ends with a call 




                                                
II. SETTING THE STAGE 
A.  HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
There is precedence for the use of military forces in domestic crisis situations. 
Military forces have led national domestic responses and provided support to civilian law 
enforcement agencies in this country throughout its existence. As recent examples, it is 
difficult to overlook the ongoing efforts of Operation Jump Start and Joint Task Force Six 
for border control and drug interdiction, and the military aircraft that assisted in the 
search for the Beltway sniper suspects in 2002. The DoD Chemical, Biological, 
Radiological, Nuclear or High Yield Explosive (CBRNE) teams that were created in 
reaction to anthrax-laced envelopes sent through the United States Postal system — as 
well as the countless Defense Support of Civil Authorities missions managed by 
NORTHCOM in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina — have also involved military 
resources. However, military intervention in domestic incidents dates as far as the 
eighteenth century.  
The general distrust of a standing peacetime army among American citizens is as 
old as the nation itself. This distrust stemmed from our founding fathers’ memories of 
abuses by the British Army, which did not allow for a military to wield unchecked power 
over the civilian populace.11  However, of equal or greater concern to the framers of the 
Constitution was an inability of the government to protect life, liberty, and property. 
These concerns “acted as an effective counterbalance to the fears of the use of federal 
military force in domestic emergencies.”12 Because of this realization, our founding 




11 Declaration of Independence, para 13–14 (1776). 
12 Robert W. Coakley, The Role of Federal Military Forces in Domestic Disorders, 1789-1878 
(Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1988): 7.  
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Robert W. Coakley’s book covers the maturing use of military forces in a 
domestic role of enforcing civil laws, legislative actions in the development of the Posse 
Comitatus Act (PCA), and the issues that compelled the passage of the act.13 A second 
book, by Clayton D. Laurie and Ronald H. Cole, continues the analysis of the application 
of military resources in domestic situations, discussing the successes and failures of 
each.14 The authors also summarize the consequences of the PCA during this time period. 
Laurie and Cole assert that  
Although the passage of the 1878 Posse Comitatus Act had a seminal 
effect on domestic interventions by placing restrictions on how and when 
federal troops could be used, and by whom, in times of crisis it was often 
ignored by both civil and military officials alike, was superseded by 
emergency, executive or general orders, or otherwise circumvented for 
what was interpreted at the time as being the public good.15
The “public good” should, inherently, be the basis for any discussion of the use of 
military forces in domestic events. An equally important concept in the American 
democratic system, however, is that the ultimate control of military power rests in 
civilian hands.  Success in domestic crisis events lies in finding a way of maximizing the 
public good within the framework of our democratic system, without sacrificing the 
capabilities held by the military, which can be of great assistance in a catastrophe.  “It is 
appropriate for those skills, funded by U.S. taxpayers, to be used in a time of great need 
by the citizens of this country.”16  
B. CURRENT LITERATURE  
Because the United States Northern Command (NORTHCOM) was established to 
provide the Command and Control of the Department of Defense efforts in a domestic 
incident, the literature analyzed in this review begins by understanding the command’s 
 
13 Coakley, The Role of Federal Military Forces in Domestic Disorders. 
14 Clayton D. Laurie and Ronald H. Cole, The Role of Federal Military Forces and Domestic 
Disorders, 1877-1945 (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1997).  
15 Ibid., 422. 
16 American Bar Association, Hurricane Katrina Task Force Subcommittee Report (ABA Standing 
Committee on Law and National Security, February 2006, viii): 28–29. 
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missions.  NORTHCOM and DoD will be used interchangeably throughout this 
document since DoD actions in the homeland are coordinated and executed through 
NORTHCOM.  
NORTHCOM’s specific missions as defined in the UCP are to conduct operations 
to deter, prevent, and defeat threats and aggression aimed at the United States, its 
territories and interests, within its assigned area of responsibility; and as directed by the 
president or the secretary of defense, provide defense support to civil authorities, 
including immediate crisis and subsequent consequence management operations.17  
As a recently established geographical combatant command, NORTHCOM is still 
developing and identifying requirements and capabilities to accomplish its mission. 
Hence, the relevant literature on the topic is still emerging. Current literature on the topic 
consists of congressional research reports and testimonies, scholarly journals, periodicals, 
and a myriad of federal government concept plans, some yet to be implemented or 
verified.  
Although the creation of the NORTHCOM has been widely accepted as a positive 
step in improving Homeland Security and Homeland Defense measures, the literature 
reviewed to this point supports the development of several distinct philosophies on the 
subject of DoD response to domestic incidents.  The first argues that things should 
remain status quo, with state and local governments running the response to a national 
crisis with DHS and DoD support. The second suggests that DoD should be the lead 
federal agency in some situations.  Additionally, a review of statutes and laws on the use  
of military Title 10 forces in domestic incidents blurs the subject by not providing clear 
and concise guidance as to when and how military capabilities should be considered for 
these missions.   
 
17 United States, Office of the Department of Defense, Unified Command Plan (Washington, DC: 
Office of the Department of Defense, 2002), classified FOUO. 
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1. First Philosophy 
This philosophy is comprised predominantly of scholarly articles and reports. 
This school of thought succinctly explains and agrees with NORTHCOM’s second 
mission of defense support to civil authorities and consequence management as “a duty 
that is appropriate and lawful” in support of civilian authorities.18 This camp continues, 
however, to express many reservations about NORTHCOM’s defense mission, to deter, 
prevent, and defeat external threats against the American homeland. The Constitution 
Project, a non-government organization established for the sole purpose of identifying 
and protecting against potential unconstitutional proposals, argues that the concept of a 
single military command charged with protecting the entire American homeland raises 
the long-standing concern that a “standing army” in the United States could pose a 
potential threat to freedom and liberty.19 Its report, The Creation of the United States 
Northern Command: Potential Constitutional, Legal, and Policy Issues Raised by a 
Unified Command for the Domestic United States, highlights that the command should 
continue to perform the consequence management mission by maintaining its supporting 
role to civilian authorities, responding only when requested by civilian authorities, and 
being tasked by civilian authorities rather than assuming command of the governmental 
response to a domestic disaster.20 The Constitution Project report admits that 
NORTHCOM is still a work in progress and insists that adequate strategic planning still 
needs to occur in order to answer three specific questions: 
1. Does the president have unchecked authority to define NORTHCOM’s Defense 
Mission? 
2. Will adequate safeguards exist to ensure that NORTHCOM forces operate 
within legal limits? 
 
18 The Constitution Project, Creation of the United States Northern Command: Potential 
Constitutional, Legal, and Policy Issues Raised by a Unified Command for the Domestic United States 
(Washington, DC: Georgetown Public Policy Institute Press, 2003): 1, 
http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/Northcom_Interim.pdf (Accessed August 21, 2006). 
19 Ibid., 2. 
20 Ibid., 2. 
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3. Should NORTHCOM be expressly precluded from intelligence gathering in the 
United States? 
Clearly, the president does not have unchecked authority to define or execute 
NORTHCOM’s defense mission; he must work within the construct of the Constitution 
and legal authorities such as the Posse Comitatus (PCA) and the Stafford Acts. The 
literature reviewed to this point warrants an in-depth look at the federal statutes that 
govern the use of active duty Title 10 forces in domestic situations; such a review will be 
undertaken later in this section.  
The same legal statutes that serve to define the authorities of the president also 
safeguard the equities of the laws themselves.  Neither of these pieces of legislature, 
however, identifies a situation where DoD roles in domestic response are clearly 
delineated.  Doubts about military operations inside the homeland are difficult to squelch, 
particularly in light of the recent NSA wiretapping debacle. The question of whether 
NORTHCOM forces can be trusted to operate within legal limits is of concern, 
particularly since the former Commander of NORAD and USNORTHCOM, General 
Ralph E. Eberhart, testified to congress in March 2003 that NORTHCOM is considering 
Special Operations missions within the homeland.21  
P. H. Liotta, chair of the Economic Geography and National Security School, U.S. 
Naval War College, argues in support of this school of thought.  In his article, 
“Boomerang Effect: The Convergence of National and Human Security,” he emphasizes 
that inter-agency cooperation will only increase in the future and that military means will 
often provide a supporting hand in many issues involving vulnerabilities — whether these 
be homeland security or environmental scarcity.22 Furthermore, he proposes the use of 
military forces for “non-traditional” means, from disease surveillance and monitoring to 
intelligence gathering and information relay networks.  Shephard Scott and Steve 
 
21 House Armed Services Committee, Statement of General Eberhart before House Armed Services 
Committee, 108th Congress, 2nd Session, March 10, 2003, 
http://www.house.gov/hasc/openingstatementsandpressreleases/108thcongress/03-03-13eberhart.html 
(Accessed September 3, 2006).  
22 P. H. Liotta, “Boomerang Effect: The Convergence of National and Human Security,” Security 
Dialogue  33, no. 4 (December 2002): 495. 
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Bowman, from the Federation of American Scientists, also write about the 
implementation of NORTHCOM’s mission to support civil authorities. They contend that 
the command has made significant strides at the national level in interagency cooperation 
and relationship building.  They discuss the organizational structure of the command and 
its components.23  Much like Liotta and the Constitution Project they verify the need for 
NORTHCOM support to civil authorities but they fall short of discussing the 
requirements for military operations in the homeland defense realm.  
Furthermore the Constitution Project goes so far as to say that a traditional 
military intelligence collection apparatus that reports directly to the Military Commander 
would be unconstitutional in the homeland because it would “subvert numerous 
Constitutional guarantees relating to privacy and illegal search and seizure.” However, 
the report does recognize that President Bush’s National Strategy for Homeland Defense 
recommends a review of whether the restrictions imposed by the Posse Comitatus Act 
should be revised.24
2. Second Philosophy 
The second sub-literature or school of thought is mostly comprised of federal 
government documents, plans and congressional testimony. These documents more 
clearly define and clarify NORTHCOM’s defense mission. The most prominent of these 
documents is the Unified Command Plan (UCP) of 2002. The UCP identifies 
NORTHCOM’s specific missions as discussed in the introduction. What the UCP does 
not clearly define is the difference between homeland defense and homeland security and 
who will perform specific tasks under each mission set.  
Later documents have attempted to rectify this deficiency, with the National 
Strategy for Homeland Security (NSHS) providing the most widely-accepted definitions:  
Homeland security is a concerted National effort to prevent terrorist 
attacks within the United States, reduce the vulnerability of the US to 
terrorism, and minimize the damage and assist in the recovery from 
 
23 Scott and Bowman, Homeland Security, 3.  
24 Constitution Project, Creation of the United States Northern Command, 2. 
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terrorist attacks. Homeland defense is the protection of US sovereignty, 
territory, domestic population, & critical defense infrastructure against 
external threats and aggression or other threats as directed by the 
President.25   
There are clear seams and gaps between these mission sets that do not clearly 
define when the use of military force will be required and/or mandated. Furthermore, 
despite DoD efforts to emphasize that the military has no desire to assume responsibility 
for traditional civilian missions, “in reality, apart from combat operations, the mission 
areas of homeland security and homeland defense overlap more often than not, 
suggesting the need for greater civil-military interaction.”26   
Other terms like, “incidents of national significance” and “catastrophic incidents,” 
further obfuscate the matter. The National Response Plan defines incidents of national 
significance27 as “an actual or potential high-impact event that requires coordination of 
federal, state, local, tribal, nongovernmental and/or private sector entities in order to save 
lives and minimize damage” and catastrophic incidents as “any natural or manmade 
incident, including terrorism, which results in extraordinary levels of mass casualties, 
damage, or disruption severely affecting the population, infrastructure, environment, 
economy, and national morale and/or government functions.”28 These definitions further 
complicate the assignment of clear duties and responsibilities between DHS and 
NORTHCOM. 
The National Response Plan outlines three primary mechanisms by which DoD 
would take part in a federal response to a domestic incident. Federal assistance, including 
DoD, would be provided: 
 
25 United States, Office of Homeland Security, The National Strategy for Homeland Security (Washington, DC: 
Office of Homeland Security, 2002): 2, http://www.hsdl.org/homesec/docs/whitehouse/nat_strat_hls.pdf 
(Accessed August 25, 2006). 
26 Thompson, “Terrorism and Domestic Response,” 17.   
27 Note: The National Response Framework (NRF) currently under revision recommends the term 
“incident of national significance” be removed/deleted from the NRP/NRF because of it being vague and 
potentially confusing. 
28 United States, Office of Homeland Security, The National Response Plan (Washington, DC: Office 
of Homeland Security, 2004): 41–43, http://www.hsdl.org/homesec/docs/dhs/nps22-053106-03.pdf (Accessed 
September 1, 2006). 
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(1) at the direction of the president; (2) if the secretary of homeland security 
declares an event an Incident of National Significance; or (3) at the request of the 
governor of the affected state in accordance with the Stafford Act. The second and third 
instances require a Request for Assistance (RFA) and approval of the secretary of defense 
in order to obligate DoD assets to provide support.29 Any Request for Assistance is 
answered through a mission assignment process that will be discussed in later chapters. 
The National Response Plan and the National Strategy for Homeland Security 
clearly identify the requirement for the defense mission.  The National Strategy for 
Homeland Security even suggests that the Posse Comitatus Act restrictions should be 
reviewed in order to identify potential changes that can better enable the use of military 
forces in the homeland.  
C. MILITARY DIRECTIVES 
Much of the confusion surrounding the use of military forces in domestic events 
can also be attributable to the sheer number of DoD Directives that govern the 
involvement of the armed forces in civil operations where the possibility exists for 
military personnel to engage in defense support of civil authorities. Unfortunately, the 
differences in the subjects each directive covers, in many cases, seem to overlap, further 
blurring the understanding of the application of military resources in domestic events. 
Following is a summary of the predominant regulations on this subject.  This list is not all 
inclusive, but serves to highlight the confusing and sometimes contradictory directives on 
this subject. 
• DoD Directive 3020.26, Continuity of Operations (COOP) Policy and 
Planning, defines the responsibilities of DoD agencies for completing critical 
missions and continuing mission-essential functions during times of emergency. 
Specifically, this document emphasizes the need for planning to facilitate 
 
29 United States, Office of Homeland Security, The National Response Plan, 42. 
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continuity of government30 missions and continuity of operations focusing on 
those operations that support the maintenance of “military effectiveness, 
readiness, and survivability.” 
• DoD Directive 3025.1, Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA), 
addresses the responsibility of DoD agencies to conduct missions for and 
provide assistance to state and local governments for the purpose of 
consequence management following a natural or manmade disaster or other 
emergency situations.31 The emphasis in this type of support is placed on 
protection of the civilian population and critical infrastructure to exclude 
support to civil law enforcement. This directive also governs the conduct of 
prior planning and coordination with civil authorities to ensure effective 
management of DoD resources.32 This directive speaks to the requesting 
process, approval authorities, and evaluation criteria used to validate military 
support to civil authorities in both emergency situations and for projected 
requirements. 
DoD Directive 3025.12, Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances (MACDIS), 
addresses the use of military forces to assist state and local authorities in quelling 
insurrections, rebellions, and domestic violence that threaten life, property, and 
the general welfare of the United States. This document mandates that DoD forces 
will be used only in this type of situation — by the authority of a Presidential 
Executive Order that defines a specific officials are unable or unwilling to deal 
with and prior presidential approval is not feasible.33
 
30 U.S. Department of Defense, Directive 3020.26, Continuity of Operations (COOP) Policy and 
Planning (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, May 26, 1995) 2, 
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/302501p.pdf (Accessed May 15, 2007). 
31 U.S. Department of Defense, Directive 3025.1, Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA) 
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, January 15, 1993) 3, 
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/302501p.pdf (Accessed May 15, 2007). 
32 Ibid., 3.  
33 U.S. Department of Defense, Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances (MACDIS) (Washington, 
DC: Government Printing Office, February 4, 1994) 5, 
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/302501p.pdf (Accessed May 15, 2007). 
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• DoD Directive 5525.5, DoD Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement 
Officials, expands the meaning of the PCA to include the Navy and Marine 
Corps and defines exceptions to the PCA based on military status (Title 10 vs. 
Title 32).34 It also describes and defines the requesting process of DoD assets 
by authorized agencies, provides a list of permissible direct assistance 
activities that are not restricted by the PCA as well as a list of actions that are 
prohibited by the PCA. This directive also provides guidelines for performing 
each of the permissible direct assistance activities (training, expert advice, and 
equipment maintenance).35 
These directives, a “convoluted mass of legalese,”36 serve to confuse and 
discourage any military commander who hopes to find clear and concise guidance for the 
legal use of military resources in domestic events.  
D. STATUTORY REVIEW 
The reluctance of the American government to use military forces in domestic 
incidents is derived from long-standing issues of public policy and social trust inherent in 
our way of life. John R. Brinkerhoff, researcher for the Institute for Defense Analyses 
and former Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Director for National 
Preparedness from 1981–1983, opines that this reluctance has been exacerbated by four 
factors: (1) an unwillingness of the DoD to get involved in domestic actions; (2) a 
“general antipathy” to the use of troops as police by the American public; (3) confusion 
and inconsistency resulting from court rulings, case law, and the misguided additions of 
 
34 U.S. Department of Defense, DoD Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials 
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, December 20, 1989) 1, 20-21 
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/302501p.pdf (Accessed May 15, 2007). 
35 Ibid., 14-17. 
36 Gerald J. Manley, The Posse Comitatus Act Post-9/11: Time for a Change? (Washington, DC: 
National Defense University, National War College, Unpublished Essay, 2003). 
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DoD directives and military regulations; and (4) poor research by authors writing about 
the Posse Comitatus Act that propagates continual misunderstandings.37  
Although Brinkerhoff is talking specifically about the Posse Comitatus Act in his 
opinion, his ideas are directly relevant to the scope of this effort. Although this act is not 
the only piece of legislation that regulates the use of military forces and capabilities in the 
homeland, it is certainly the most frequently quoted in DoD directives, and frequently 
misunderstood by policy makers and DoD leaders. Therefore, it is imperative that we 
clarify some of the “continual misunderstandings” about the overall national policy on 
the use of military forces in domestic incidents in accordance with this act.  
A review of the Posse Comitatus Act itself, Title 18, U.S. Code Section 1385, as 
amended, identifies it as a criminal statute.  
Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized 
by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the 
Army or Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws 
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for not more than two years, or 
both.38 
The Stafford Act, much like the Posse Comitatus Act, guides the actions of the 
president and safeguards the constraints of the constitution. It authorizes the POTUS to 
provide DoD assets for relief efforts, once the POTUS formally declares an emergency or 
a major disaster. DoD assets for emergency work may be provided on a limited basis 
prior to the presidential declaration. DoD policy for providing disaster assistance (as 
related to the Stafford Act) is contained in DoDD 3025.15 Military Assistance to Civil 
Authorities (MACA), and DoDD 3025.1 Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA).39 
These directives were summarized above, but will be discussed in more details in later 
chapters.  
 
37 John R. Brinkerhoff, “The Posse Comitatus Act and Homeland Security” (Washington, DC: Ansler 
Institute of Homeland Security, February 2002): 1, 
http://www.homelandsecurity.org/journal/Articles/brinkerhoffpossecomitatus.htm (accessed December 8, 
2006). 
38 United States Congress, Posse Comitatus Act, U.S. Code, Title 18, sec. 1385 (1878). 
39 United States Congress, House of Representatives, Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency 
Assistance Act, 107th Congress, 2nd sess, 2000, Pub. L. 106–390, & 301. 
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A further review of the Posse Comitatus Act finds that it does allow use of 
military forces in the homeland for some intelligence and surveillance activities and 
limited operations.40 The act does not apply to the National Guard when it is operating at 
the direction of the state governor because it not part of the Army or Air Force and is 
operating as a state militia. The act does apply when the National Guard is in a federal 
(Title 10) status. Furthermore, it does not apply to military operations, such as flying 
defensive missions over U.S. cities, protecting military installations, or enforcing law and 
regulations on military installations.41 The act does not apply to situations that are 
recognized as exceptions by the U.S. Constitution or statute. Key exceptions are the 
Insurrection Act (Title 10, U.S. Code Sections 331-335 and 672 et seq, as amended) as 
well as Title 10, U.S. Code Section 382 and Title 10, U.S. Code Section 831, which allow 
military forces to take enforcement action related to chemical and biological weapons of 
mass destruction in an emergency situation declared by the U.S. attorney general and 
SECDEF.42 It is also important to note that neither the U.S. Navy nor the U.S. Coast 
Guard are restricted in the same manner as the U.S. Army and the U.S. Air Force while 
operating in the homeland. 
The Heritage Foundation, much like the Constitution Project, and a widely 
accepted national guidance like the National Strategy for Homeland Security have all 
recommended a review of current statues on the subject to discover more proactive use of 
DoD forces and assets for HLS purposes.43 In October of 2006, the Homeland Security 
Council directed the DoD and the DHS to develop recommendations for revision of the 
NRP to delineate the circumstances, objectives, and limitations of when DoD might 
temporarily assume the lead for the federal response to a catastrophic incident.44 
Interestingly enough, although these scholarly organizations and national security policy 
 
40 United States Congress, Posse Comitatus Act, U.S. Code, Title 18, sec. 1385 as revised by the 1971 
"Packard Memo" or "Employment of Military Resources in the Event of Civil Disturbances," which 
modified the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 32, Volume 2, Chapter 1, Part 215, Section 6, providing 
exceptions to the Act. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid.  
43 Constitution Project, Creation of the United States Northern Command, 2. 
44 Derived from NORTHCOM Katrina Lessons Learned video teleconference, October 2006. 
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bodies have recommended these reviews, legislation that recommends changes to these 
policies has not been forthcoming. Furthermore, attempts at modifying current statues 
such as the National Defense Enhancement and National Guard Empowerment Act 
proposed by Senator Patrick Leahy from Vermont, failed to survive the senate vote in 
September of 2006.45   
This philosophy is also concerned with the recently debated amendment to the 
Insurrection Act. The 2007 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), Section 1076, 
amends the Insurrection Act in several ways.  It renames the Insurrection Act the 
“Enforcement of the Laws to Restore Public Order” (ELRPO), and amends Section 333 
to authorize the president, without request from the state, to employ the armed forces, 
including the National Guard in federal status, to suppress insurrection or restore public 
order and enforce the laws of the United States where the insurrection or lawlessness 
causes an associated deprivation of Constitutional rights.46 It further permits the president 
greater authority to employ the armed forces in response to natural disasters, terrorist 
attacks, and epidemics/serious public health emergencies, or other situations47 if the state 
cannot maintain public order, and if violence results in a condition that hinders the 
execution of the law of the state and the U.S., therefore deprivng any part or class of 
people of the Constitutional rights, privileges or protections. If the POTUS invokes the 
authorities granted to his office under ELRPO, he may provide only supplies, services 
and equipment to the extent state authorities are unable, and may act only until the state is 
able, and may act only to the extent it does not interfere with military operations.48  
Similarly, other legislature allows some leeway in the use of military forces in the 
homeland. DoDD 3025.1 establishes a commander’s “immediate response” authority. 
 
45 United States Congress, House of Representatives, National Defense Enhancement and National 
Guard Empowerment Act, HR 5200, 109th Cong., 4th sess., September 30, 2006, 
http://leahy.senate.gov/press/200604/042606a.html (Accessed October 9, 2006).   
46 United States Congress, House of Representatives, John Warner Defense Authorization Act of 2007, 
HR 5122, 109th Cong, 4th sess., September 30, 2006, Public Law 109-364, Sec 1076, “Enforcement of the 
Laws to Restore Public Order,” 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/bdquery/z?d109:HR05122:@@@L&summ2=m& (Accessed June 1, 2007). 
47 Ibid. 
48 United States Congress, House of Representatives, John Warner Defense Authorization Act of 2007. 
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This authority allows military commanders to provide disaster relief when “imminently 
serious conditions resulting from any civil emergency or attack . . . require immediate 
action by military commanders” in order to “save lives, prevent human suffering, or 
mitigate great property damage.”49 Immediate response authority is generally terminated 
upon the conclusion of support being rendered for small-scale local responses, or once 
FEMA is operating at its deployed command center at the disaster incident site.50 This 
immediate response policy warrants another question.  Can a military commander 
consider it his duty, under “immediate response,” if the state requests preemptively use 
his forces to prevent an attack that will obviously cause lose of life, human suffering and 
great property damage? Furthermore, if this decision is made, how would the military 
commander integrate with civilian law enforcement agencies that will undoubtedly be 
planning or conducting operations in parallel?  
The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) initiated a study to 
reflect the impact of these important issues on the Reserve Component. The CSIS study 
focuses on how the National Guard and Reserves should be organized, trained, and 
equipped to carry out the roles and missions of civil support tasks, as part of its ongoing 
Beyond Goldwater-Nichols project.51 “The Guard and Reserve study team’s goal was to 
provide practical, actionable recommendations to DoD to help shape the Reserve 
Component effectively for the future.”52 This study provides numerous recommendations 
for the future of the National Guard and Reserve forces employment in Homeland 
Defense and Civil Support missions. Among these are a need for DoD to accept civil 
support as a central mission, and leveraging the National Guard to be the backbone of 
regional Civil Support Forces.53 The U.S. Army commissioned the Rand Corporation to 
 
49 U.S. Department of Defense, Directive 3025.1, Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA) 
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, January 15, 1993), 5 
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/302501p.pdf (Accessed May 15, 2007). 
50 Congress, Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act. 
51 Christine E. Wormuth, Michele A Flournoy, Patrick T. Henry, Clark A Murdock, The Future of the 
National Guard and Reserves: The Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Phase Three Report (Washington DC: 
Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 2007: VII. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Wormuth et al., The Future of the National Guard and Reserves 7, XI. 
 21
                                                
complete a similar study titled Hurricane Katrina: Lessons for Army Planning and 
Operations. This study focused efforts on analyzing the timeliness and robustness of the 
Army, both Title 10 and National Guard components, in response to Hurricane Katrina.54 
Additionally, this study recommended that DoD take a more proactive role in civil 
support by establishing regional Civil Support Battalions to match the multi-state FEMA 
regional framework.55 These studies provide some clear recommendations for the future 
of the Reserve Components and the Department of the Army with respect to civil support 
missions. They do not, however, clarify how these missions will be coordinated with 
other federal, state and local agencies. Furthermore, both these studies recommend that 
DoD move away from viewing its role in a domestic crisis as a one-dimensional event 
that would respond only in a terrorist incident. Clearly, as we have discussed earlier, 
Hurricane Katrina demonstrated that the DoD role in domestic incidents should be 
analyzed in an “all hazards approach.”   
E. LITERATURE REVIEW CONCLUSION 
The Unified Command Plan, National Response Plan and the National Strategy 
for Homeland Security create a blend of disciplines between the newly established 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the more deeply-rooted DoD. DHS seeks 
to manage federal relationships by networks that rely on lateral relationships among 
member jurisdictions. The first philosophy studied asserts that, to the extent that 
intergovernmental policies exist in the area of DoD actions in a national crisis, these 
policies are voluntarily embraced and enforced by mutual agreements. Furthermore, these 
policies do not pose clear and concise responsibilities and roles for DoD in the area of 
DSCA because they see DoD involvement in civil support as a fallback and failsafe 
alternative to a civilian response. To the contrary, the second philosophy points out that 
DoD encourages coordination and management of federal, state, and local action in a top-
down or hierarchical fashion and relies on authority to manage. Therefore, this 
 
54 Davis et al., Hurricane Katrina, Lessons for Army Planning and Operations (Washington DC: 
RAND, January 2007): iii. 
55 Ibid. 
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philosophy has strong reservations about the current DoD framework’s ability to perform 
effectively in domestic operations because of a misunderstanding of the legislation and 
lack of DoD policy that enables a civil support mission. The statues that govern the 
execution of actions reviewed in the different philosophies further obfuscate the matter 
by establishing a myriad of legal requirements that must be met before DoD can take 
action in response to a domestic catastrophic incident. These different approaches to 
intergovernmental management create challenges in management areas — like 
organization, interagency cooperation, information sharing and future strategy — that 
must be resolved before the homeland faces the next catastrophic event.  
F. HOW KATRINA HAS SHAPED THE SUBJECT 
An analysis of the potential requirements for the president to take an executive 
decision to utilize the DoD to provide a large portion of the response to a domestic 
situation finds that this political decision is marred with controversy. There is a great deal 
of national policy to analyze on the subject of DoD roles in homeland security and 
homeland defense. Fundamental to any discussion on this subject is a strong foundation 
in federalism unique to American government. With regards to federalism, the major 
struggles in American history, continuing to present times, have been related to the 
struggle for power between the states and central government.56 However, in the nation’s 
history, major historical events with potential for cataclysmic outcomes — like 9/11 and 
Hurricane Katrina — have inevitably allowed for more centralization of power in the 
national government.57    
Much has been written about the perceived protracted federal response to one of 
these potential “cataclysmic events”: Hurricane Katrina.  The House Select Bipartisan 
Report on this event, A Failure of Initiative, states that the call for increasing the 
military’s role in domestic incidents is reasonable: “...who else can respond the way the 
 
56 Samuel H. Clovis Jr., “Federalism, Homeland Security and National Preparedness: A Case Study in 
the Development of Public Policy,” Homeland Security Affairs II, no. 3 (October 2006): 2, 
http://www.hsaj.org (Accessed December 28, 2006). 
57 Ellis Katz, American Federalism, Past, Present and Future (Washington, DC: United States 
Department of State, 1997), http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itdhr/0497/jijda/Katz.htm (Accessed December 
28, 2006). 
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military can? Who else can stand up when others have fallen?”58  This thesis argues that 
a domestic incident of the magnitude of this natural disaster is the type of situation where 
the DoD capabilities and response need to be reorganized for a more comprehensive and 
expeditious execution. During the 2004 Indonesian Tsunami relief efforts, the 
Department of Defense responded by delivering emergency supplies within eighteen 
hours of the tsunami.59  During Hurricane Katrina, however, emergency relief supplies 
were not delivered by DoD aircraft until approximately thirty-six hours after the 
hurricane had subsided. If military forces had been structured and organized to properly 
address civil support missions, the DoD response to Katrina could have enabled the 
military logistical infrastructure more quickly and effectively than the cumbersome local, 
state and federal/ FEMA architecture currently utilized.   
From another perspective, this thesis argues that, according to the National 
Response Plan, legal and constitutional standards exist for DoD to more proactively 
organize a military response in specific situations where the nation’s security is at 
stake.60 Additionally, Major General (Ret) Walter Huffman, the former U.S. Army Judge 
Advocate General (JAG), agrees with the NRP and asserts that the presidential authorities 
available through the Insurrection Act and under Article II of the U.S. Constitution are 
sufficient to allow the president to contain a crisis in which the nation’s security could be 
imperiled.61 Furthermore, implementation of more aggressive DoD civil support response 
would be relatively straightforward since the DoD, as noted in the White House report on 
the federal response to Hurricane Katrina, has an extensive communications, 
transportation, and logistical infrastructure already in place across the homeland.62  If   
Huffman’s premise — that sufficient legal authorities exist for DoD to be more proactive 
 
58 U.S. House of Representatives Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and 
Response to Hurricane Katrina, A Failure of Initiative, 109th Cong., 2d sess., 2006, S. Rep. 000-000, 15. 
59 Rhoda Margesson, Indian Ocean Earthquake and Tsunami: Humanitarian Assistance and Relief 
Operations (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2005): 17, 
https://www.hsdl.org/homesec/docs/crs/nps21-112105-20.pdf (Accessed December 15, 2006). 
60 Office of Homeland Security, National Response Plan, 9, 43. 
61 Katherine J. Gereski, “The Department of Defense as Lead Federal Agency,” Homeland Security 
Affairs II, no. 3 (October 2006):  6, http://www.hsaj.org  (Accessed December 15, 2006). 
62 White House, Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina, 57. 
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in domestic incidents — is accepted, it can then be inferred that it is human behavior, 
political interpretations, and cultural perceptions of what is right and wrong in a 
democratic society, through the establishment of policies, that hinder the application of 
DoD capabilities in domestic events. Therefore DoD must lead the way by changing 
military policies that hinder the development of military civil support forces.  
Hurricane Katrina is but only one example of how the current national policy on 
the use of military forces does not maximize all instruments of national power during 
domestic catastrophic incidents. For instance, limitations under federal law and DoD 
policy cause the active-duty military to be dependent on requests for assistance from 
other federal, state and local entities. These limitations result in a slowed application of 
DoD resources during the initial response to a catastrophic event.  This slow response 
causes excessive and needles loss of life, human suffering, and damage and destruction to 
national critical infrastructure. 
The following chapter will present two situational vignettes, carved from the 
fifteen National Planning Scenarios. In the author’s opinion, these vignettes are best 
suited to present examples of how the current framework of DoD response to support of 
civil authorities is engineered to work in response to a national crises situation.  
Additional chapters will analyze these vignettes, not with the intent of presenting an 
argument in favor of placing DoD in lead of the entire federal response, but to define and 
identify situations where the current DoD response framework is flawed. Furthermore, 
these chapters will recommend both a framework of DoD support to civilian agencies 
that can best leverage DoD capabilities and resources for DSCA missions, and how DoD 
should prepare for these missions.   
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III. CRITICAL SCENARIOS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The fifteen National Planning Scenarios were developed as a tool to measure 
national preparedness activities from the federal to the local level. The Homeland 
Security Council coordinated this effort across the entire federal interagency 
community.63 The scenarios cover a broad range of potential threats to homeland security 
and provide a great opportunity to evaluate federal preparedness and response plans.  
This study uses two scenarios that are most likely to escalate to a national or 
regional level and that will require significant amounts of federal and DoD support:  
National Planning Scenario # 1, Detonation of a 10-kiloton Improvised Nuclear Device; 
and National Planning Scenario # 9, Major Earthquake.  A brief overview and summary 
of assumed consequences from the scenario event are presented. Furthermore, this 
analysis identifies areas where the DoD support will be required. The National Response 
Plan and the National Incident Management System guidance for the identification, 
request, approval and execution process required for the DoD support to reach the 
agencies or entities that requested DoD assistance is analyzed for each scenario. 
B. SCENARIO # 1: DETONATION OF A 10-KILOTON IMPROVISED 
NUCLEAR DEVICE (NATIONAL PLANNING SCENARIO # 1) 
1. Scenario Overview 
In this scenario, a 10-kiloton nuclear device is smuggled into the United States 
and detonated near a large metropolitan area.  A device of this magnitude will destroy 
most buildings within a half-mile radius of the detonation. Injuries from flying debris and 
secondary fires may occur out to three-quarters of a mile. An Electromagnetic Pulse will 
                                                 
63 National Planning Scenarios (Washington Post, April 2005) 4, 
http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/nation/nationalsecurity/earlywarning/NationalPlanningScenariosApril2005.pdf (Accessed April 20, 
2007). 
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damage many electronic devices within approximately three miles. A radioactive 
mushroom cloud will rise above the city and begin to drift along the prevailing wind 
direction.64   
2. Key Assumptions65   
• The detonation of a nuclear device inside the homeland will be immediately 
recognized by national level authorities and an Incident of National Significance 
will be declared by the POTUS or the Secretary of the Department of Homeland 
Security. 
• Panic and the lack of electrical power and viable roads will contribute to traffic 
fatalities/injuries and will further complicate any directed or self-initiated 
evacuation.  
• Workers, to include first responders, may be unwilling to perform their jobs due 
to fears of radiation or contamination. 
• Basic human needs such as electricity, water, food, communication/information 
and medical services will be disrupted across the affected area. Service will be 
restored outside of a twenty-mile radius of the immediate detonation area within 
ten to twenty days following the explosion. Services in the immediate area of the 
explosion will not be available for a significantly longer time due to radioactive 
contamination of the area and the extent of the damage.  
• All medical facilities in the area will be immediately overwhelmed.  
• Many first responders will subject themselves to large and perhaps fatal doses of 
radiation. 
• A Temporary Flight Restriction will be required over the affected area; this will 
further complicate and delay evacuation and response. 
• Tens of thousands will require evacuation and decontamination. 
• Limiting the time rescue crews are exposed to contaminated areas will hamper 
and delay search and rescue operations. 
 
Although the above-mentioned assumptions are not all-encompassing, for the 
purposes of this analysis, they are sufficient to justify and require a large DoD support 
footprint for the given scenario.   
 
 
64National Planning Scenarios, 10. 
65 Ibid., 13-14. 
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3. Areas Where DoD Support will be Required 
Given this scenario, it is not difficult to grasp the need for federal assistance in 
many areas. This analysis we will focus on DoD support in the area of Chemical, 
Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and High Explosive (CBRNE) response teams.    
State National Guard units are developing Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil 
Support Teams (WMD-CST) that will be tasked to support civil authorities in their state 
at a CBRNE incident site.66 These teams will be followed or augmented by a CBRNE 
Enhanced Response Force package (CERFP).  It is these units that will be tasked with 
searching an incident site, rescuing and decontaminating casualties, performing medical 
triage and stabilizing patients for transport to a medical facility.67 In a scenario of this 
magnitude it is clear that this capability will be absolutely essential and in high demand.  
4. How will the DoD Assistance be Requested? 
When any incident occurs, response begins at local jurisdictions.  As local efforts 
become overwhelmed, resources are requested from the state level. State governors and 
emergency management officials will normally inform the president and appropriate 
federal departments of their need for support if they become overwhelmed.  It is at this 
time that the National Response Plan will begin to organize the federal response.   
The authorities that govern the request and approval of DoD assets in domestic 
events are different depending on the type of domestic event being supported.  In this 
situation our first assumption was that the POTUS or the secretary of DHS has issued an 
Incident of National Significance declaration.  This step is important because without it 
the procedures for requesting assistance from the federal government would be managed 
by the Economy Act of 1932 instead of the Stafford Act.68   The Incident of National 
Significance declaration will be accompanied by the establishment of a Primary Agency 
 
66 Wormuth et al., The Future of the National Guard and Reserves,71. 
67 Ibid., 72. 
68 Reimbursement is the means by which the interagency support procedures are organized. Unless 
waived by the POTUS or SECDEF, all DoD support is provided on a reimbursable basis.  The Economy 
Act of 1932 delineates management guidelines for interagency reimbursement.  
(PA) that has jurisdictional authority over the incident. According to the National 
Response Plan, the Primary Agency will establish a Joint Field Office (JFO) to 
coordinate the federal assistance to the affected jurisdictions.69 The JFO should be co-
located with the state Emergency Operations Center (EOC).  The state’s Request for 
Assistance (RFA) to DoD will begin at the JFO through the Defense Coordinating 
Officer (DCO). The DCO will field and validate requests for DoD assistance before they 
are forwarded to both FEMA and DoD.70 In the next few paragraphs, we will explain this 
process step-by-step as outlined in the NRP and depicted in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1.   National Response Plan Outline.71 
 
Assume that a State Emergency Operations Center has determined that there is a 
requirement for more WMD-CST/CERFP capabilities and that the State National Guard 
capabilities have been exhausted (Step 1). At this point, a request for assistance is 
forwarded to the State Coordinating Officer at the Emergency Operations Center/Joint 
Field Office (Step 2). The State Coordinating Officer will enable any Emergency 
 
69 United States, Office of Homeland Security, The National Response Plan (Washington, DC: Office 
of Homeland Security, 2004), 16. 
70 Ibid., 42. 
71 Robert Reininger, DoD Request for Assistance and Mission Assignment Process, NORAD and 
USNORTHCOM Interagency Coordination Directorate Power Point Brief, slide 5, 1 March 2007.  
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Management Agreement Compact (EMAC)72 arrangements they may have with 
neighboring states for the use of their WMD-CST/CERFP capabilities.  Once these 
EMAC assets are exhausted, or if they are not available, the State Coordinating Officer 
presents the request to the Federal Coordinating Officer (Step 3). An Action Request 
Form (ARF) is developed and provided to all the Emergency Support Functions (ESF) 
for review and analysis.  If it is determined that the ESFs are unable to support the 
request, it is sent to the Defense Coordinating Officer for his analysis (Step 4). The DCO 
(and his staff, the Defense Coordinating Element or DCE) validates the Action Request 
Form if DoD is able to support the request.  The validated request form is returned to the 
Federal Coordinating Officer who is now responsible for determining/forwarding the 
ARF as a FEMA Mission Assignment (MA) request (for DoD it is still called a RFA until 
approved by SECDEF) (Step 5). The FEMA Mission Assignment is now simultaneously 
forwarded to USNORTHCOM for mission analysis and to the Joint Director of Military 
Support (JDOMS) at the Pentagon and JDOMS forwards it to the office of the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense (ASD/HD) and the SECDEF for validation 
and approval.  Once SECDEF approves the FEMA Mission Assignment or Request for 
Assistance, it becomes a DoD Mission Assignment (Step 6).  JDOMS now issues and 
Execute Order (EXORD) to NORTHCOM or any other Supported Combatant Command, 
Service, or Agency that will participate in the DoD mission assignment.  An important 
step in this process is the sourcing of the military personnel and assets that will 
accomplish the DoD Mission Assignment.  JDOMS has the responsibility to identify and 
notify the units that will participate. Figure 2 provides a summary of these steps. 
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Figure 2.   Request for Assistance with DCO/JTF. 73 
5. Scenario # 1 Conclusion 
Scenario # 1 provides an opportunity to understand how the National Response 
Plan, through the National Incident Management System, will organize the federal 
response to an Incident of National Significance.  Although the plan has a Catastrophic 
Incident Annex74 that provides more detailed guidance in the event of national response 
of higher magnitude, the process for requesting DoD assistance would not change 
drastically.   
Although Scenario # 1 would undoubtedly require DoD support in many other 
areas, the purpose of this analysis was to clarify the process by which each specific type 
of DoD support is vetted and approved.  Although the National Response Plan process 
described above is burdensome, it must be followed for every individual Request for 
Assistance or FEMA mission assigned to DoD.   
 
73 Reininger, DoD Request for Assistance and Mission Assignment Process, slide 10. 
74 United States, Office of Homeland Security, The National Response Plan. 
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A few exceptions to the assistance request process will also bring military assets 
and forces to bear on a domestic incident. Regardless of a disaster declaration, under the 
provisions of “Immediate Response Authority,” military commanders may respond to 
requests for support from civil authorities in order to save lives, prevent human suffering, 
or mitigate great property damage under imminently serious conditions resulting from 
civil emergencies or attacks.75 DoDD 3025.1 provides a list of authorized immediate 
response activities that span from rescue, evacuation, and emergency medical treatment 
to facilitating the establishment of civil government functions.76  
Another exception to the Request for Assistance process is the use of the Request 
for Forces (RFF) process. In a catastrophic incident NORTHCOM is likely to establish a 
Joint Task Force (JTF) to be collocated with the JFO and assist in the Command and 
Control of the DoD response.77  The JTF commander can approve mission assignments 
that the troops under his command could accomplish. If the JTF can not accomplish the 
mission, the JTF commander will make a RFF to NORTHCOM for equipment and 
personnel required to support the JTF mission.78 NORTHCOM will request force 
capabilities by message to the Joint Staff.79 This RFF will proceed through a process 
similar to the RFA process once it enters the Pentagon. However, the sourcing of the 
capabilities for RFFs and RFAs is coordinated through JDOMS once the NORTHCOM 
mission analysis is complete. In later chapters, we will discuss the implications of this 
process on the execution of the civil support mission.     
The RFA and RFF approval process can vary drastically in the amount of time it 
will take to be approved depending on the efficiency and effectiveness of an EOC, JFO, 
 
75 United States, Office of Homeland Security, The National Response Plan, 545.  
76 U.S. Department of Defense, Directive 3025.1, Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA) 
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, January 15, 1993) 7-8, 
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/302501p.pdf (Accessed May 15, 2007). 
77 U.S. Department of Defense, Concept of Operations Plan 2501-05, Defense Support of Civil 
Authorities (Headquarters, US Northern Command, April 2006), 346 (re-issued as CONPLAN 3501 in 




                                                
DCO and the Pentagon.80  Although the time required for the administration of Step 1 
through Step 5 can vary this analysis assumes that twenty-four hours is an appropriate 
amount of time to determine that DoD assistance is needed and gain SECDEF approval 
of the DoD MA. Although the approval process poses numerous challenges that will be 
discussed later, the timely and effective notification, preparation, deployment and 
employment of military capabilities in support of a domestic incident is also a major 
concern. 
Scenario # 2 provides a slightly different look at the National Response Plan 
process and the DoD validation and approval procedures since the process may or may 
not be governed by the Stafford Act. 
C. SCENARIO # 2: MAJOR EARTHQUAKE (NATIONAL PLANNING 
SCENARIO # 9) 
1. Scenario Overview 
In this scenario, a 7.0-magnitude or greater earthquake occurs along a fault zone 
in a major metropolitan area of a city. The earthquake greatly impacts a six-county region 
with a population of approximately ten million people. An estimated one hundred and 
fifty thousand buildings will be destroyed and over one million buildings will be 
damaged.  At a minimum, three hundred thousand households will need to be evacuated.  
Critical infrastructure such as ports, airports and highways will be destroyed further 
complicating response efforts.81   
 
 
80 The White House, Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned (Washington, DC: 
The White House, 2006), 42–43, provides a synopsis of the DoD troop deployment across a 5–7 day 
timeline after the hurricane had subsided.   
81 National Planning Scenarios (Washington Post, April 2005), 105, 
http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/nation/nationalsecurity/earlywarning/NationalPlanningScenariosApril2005.pdf (Accessed April 20, 
2007). 
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2.  Key Assumptions:82
• The earthquake damage will need to be assessed prior to the state governor 
making a state of emergency declaration or requesting the POTUS or the 
Secretary of DHS make a declaration of an Incident of National Significance. 
• The lack of electrical power and viable roads will contribute to traffic 
fatalities/injuries and will further complicate any directed or self-initiated 
evacuation.  
• Workers, to include first responders, may be unwilling or unavailable to perform 
their jobs since their work places and homes will be damaged by the disaster. 
• Basic human needs such as electricity, water, food, communication/information 
and medical services will be disrupted across the affected area. Service will be 
restored outside of a twenty-mile radius of the disaster area within ten to twenty 
days following the earthquake. Services in the immediate area of the earthquake 
will not be available for a significantly longer time due to critical infrastructure 
damage and possible contamination of the area (hazardous material spills).  
• All medical facilities in the area will be immediately overwhelmed.  
• Tens of thousands will require evacuation and medical treatment. 
 
Although the above-mentioned assumptions are not all-encompassing for the 
purposes of this analysis, they are sufficient to justify and require a large DoD support 
footprint for the given scenario. 
3. Areas Where DoD Support will be Required 
This scenario, like the first scenario studied, will require a significant DoD 
support structure. The analysis we will focus on DoD assistance in the area of 
transportation and logistical support.    
DoD in coordination with the National Guard Bureau (NGB) is developing a Port 
Opening Joint Task Force (JTF-PO) for the purposes of responding to civil support 
request for re-establishing the operation of major sea and aerial ports.83 JTF-PO is a 
 
82 National Planning Scenarios, 106.  
83 Kenneth King, Joint Task Force—Port Opening: supplies when you need them most (Translog: 
Journal of Military Transportation Management, Summer 2006) 1, 
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0LEG/is_2006_Summer/ai_n16675885 (Accessed Mar 10, 2007). 
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concept that the United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) and the 
Surface Deployment and Distribution Command have developed to bring logistical 
support and open distribution nodes with an early entry force opening distribution 
pipelines immediately after natural disaster. With this expeditionary capability, supplies 
can be brought in within hours after the military has arrived, in order to support the range 
of military operations that will be supporting civilian authorities after a natural disaster.84 
In a scenario of this magnitude, it is clear that this capability will be absolutely essential 
and in high demand.  
4.  How will the DoD Assistance be Requested? 
In some circumstances, Stafford Act Request for Assistance may originate from 
the State Emergency Operations Center, as discussed in the first scenario. In other 
situations, requests may originate at the FEMA Regional Response Coordination Center 
(RRCC) or the FEMA National Response Coordination Center (NRCC) and pass directly 
to the DoD Executive Secretary (ASD/HD), vice through a Defense Coordinating 
Officer.  This may occur for initial requests in accordance with the National Response 
Plan where an Incident of National Significance has not been established, or when a 
Defense Coordinating Officer is not assigned or available to the FEMA regional office,  
or when the request is thought to be Non-Stafford Act. These requests are processed  
the same as Non-Stafford Act requests, with JDOMS and USNORTHCOM  
conducting parallel coordination and providing a recommendation to ASD/HD  
and the SecDef for approval or disapproval.85
In Scenario # 2, a request for a JTF-PO-type support will be initiated by the 
Primary Agency (Step 1). The request will be sent to the DoD Executive Secretary 
directly by the Primary Agency because the Defense Coordinating Officer may not be 
deployed (Step 2), it is then forwarded to ASD/HD for validation (Step 3). JDOMS will 
 
84  King, Joint Task Force—Port Opening. 
85 U.S. Department of Defense, Directive 3025.15, Military Assistance to Civil Authorities 
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, February 18, 1997) 5, 
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/302501p.pdf (Accessed May 15, 2007). (Under revision, will 
be re-issued under the name Defense Support of Civil Authorities). 
process the request, primarily for sourcing, in coordination with NORTHCOM, who will 
provide mission analysis (Step 4). SECDEF approves the request (Step 5), and JDOMS 
issues an EXORD (Step 6) to NORTHCOM and any other supported Combatant 
Commander, Service, or agency that will provide support for the request. The command 
authorities task the units and they deploy to provide the support requested. Figure 3 
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Figure 3.   Request for Assistance without DCO/JTF. 86 
5.  Scenario # 2 Conclusion 
Scenario # 2 provides an opportunity to understand how the National Response 
Plan will organize the federal response to a domestic incident that has not been declared 
an Incident of National Significance.  Although the plans’ framework in this case is 
somewhat simplified, it still requires a very comprehensive process.  This process 
guarantees that the statutory and legislative requirements of all the applicable laws — 
like the Posse Comitatus Act, the Stafford Act, and the Insurrection Act (ELRPO) 
discussed in the legal review — are vetted against all the DoD directives (3025 series) via 
                                                 
86 Reininger, DoD Request for Assistance and Mission Assignment Process, slide 8. 
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a validation process that spans from the DCO to the SECDEF.  However, to fully 
understand the DoD validation process the criteria used in this process need to be clearly 
understood.   
D. DOD VALIDATION PROCESS 
DoD Directive 3025.15 identifies the criteria the Defense Coordinating Officer, 
ASD/HD and the SECDEF will use to validate all requests for military assistance by civil 
authorities. These criteria are legality, lethality, risk, cost, appropriateness, and 
readiness.87  Legality, the first of these criteria, requires a complete understanding of all 
the statutory implications and legislative and executive authorities that may apply to the 
situation. 
This depth of understanding does not rest solely on the shoulders of the Defense 
Coordinating Officer.  That is why, under this criterion, a Request for Assistance for DoD 
capabilities requires numerous validation steps from the Defense Coordinating Officer to 
the SECDEF. Although recent legislation — such as the changes to the Insurrection Act 
or Enforcement of the Laws to Restore Public Order — has given federal authorities 
more leeway in the employment of military capabilities, the legality criteria are 
absolutely essential to ensure the principles of federalism, which are the bedrock of our 
Constitution, are upheld. 
Lethality is a determination of the potential use of lethal force by or against DoD 
forces.88 In the examination of this condition, the DoD validation process must weigh the 
likelihood of the use of lethal force against the urgency of the situation. If the situation 
indicates any real potential of lethality, the validation process must determine the true 
necessity of military forces. 
 
87 U.S. Department of Defense, Directive 3025.15, Military Assistance to Civil Authorities 
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, February 18, 1997) 3, 
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/302501p.pdf (Accessed May 15, 2007). (Under revision; will 
be re-issued under the name Defense Support of Civil Authorities). 
88 Ibid. 
 37
                                                
Risk is a measure of safety of DoD forces89 and also relies heavily upon the 
urgency of the situation. In domestic operations, risk to the forces can be mitigated by 
using protective equipment, training for civil support missions, and integrating with local 
authorities.  
Cost as a criterion for approving military support is really addressed under the 
statutes that authorize the use of the DoD assets.  Any costs incurred by DoD 
employment in support of civilian authorities will be reimbursed under the authorities of 
the Stafford Act, if an Incident of National Significance has been declared — or the 
Economy Act, if no emergency declaration has been established. 
Appropriateness is simply a measure of whether military action is the right thing 
to do. The Defense Coordinating Officer is the first to determine if the incident merits the 
use of military force, and if military involvement will achieve the desired effects, 
however, this criterion is evaluated from the DCO to the SECDEF.  
The last criterion provided in DoDD 3025.15, Readiness, is the consideration of 
the implications of authorizing and undertaking a domestic support mission on the 
warfighting readiness of the force.90 If the involvement of the military in domestic 
operations produces a subsequent degradation in the ability of that force to deploy, 
conduct combat operations, or complete mission-essential tasks, the use of military assets 
is weighed very closely against the requirements of the situation by the DoD executive 
Secretary, ASD/HD, and the SECDEF. These concerns are reflected in the JFCOM 
sourcing of these units. Therefore, the sourcing process can take in excess of twenty-four 
hours. The importance of this time requirement will be evident in later discussions. 
E.  CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of the analysis in this chapter was to clarify the National Response 
Plan and DoD process for validating and providing defense support to civil authorities. 
Two different scenarios, carved out of the National Planning Scenarios, were used to 
 
89 U.S. Department of Defense, Directive 3025.15, 3. 
90 Ibid, 3. 
, or equipment 
exclusively for providing DSCA, unless otherwise directed by the secretary of defense” 
and “USNORTHCOM has no legal authority to initiate DSCA operations without the 
approval of the president or SECDEF”.91 Therefore, any deployment and employment of 
military assets and capabilities requires validation to ensure no degradation of military 
missions and readiness.   
 
 
Figure 4.   RFA Process Matrix. 92 
 
                                                 
91 U.S. Department of Defense, Concept of Operations Plan 2501-05, Defense Support of Civil 





Chapter IV will focus on the analysis of the vignettes presented in Chapter III. 
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and employment of military assets is response to Request for Assistance and Request for 
Forces. Furthermore, it will pinpoint reasons why this effort is insufficient to adequately 
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IV. CURRENT DOD RESPONSE FRAMEWORK  
A.  INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to highlight current DoD initiatives to address gaps 
in the current DoD civil support response framework. To accomplish this, a thorough 
analysis the Request for Assistance and Request for Forces process presented in the 
vignettes in Chapter III will be conducted to identify flaws in the current DoD response 
framework. These flaws in the process will be compared against the DoD initiatives 
intended to fill these gaps to emphasize areas that need to be re-structured to ensure an 
efficient Defense Support of Civil Authorities framework.    
B. DOD CANNOT SUPPORT ALL EMERGENCY SUPPORT FUNCTIONS 
IN THE NATIONAL RESPONSE PLAN IN AN EFFECTIVE MANNER 
Chapter III emphasized that the National response Plan provides the operational 
framework for the coordination of federal support to state, local, and tribal incident 
managers and for two exercising direct federal authorities and responsibilities.93  
Furthermore, it pointed out that DoD is the only agency identified in the plan that has a 
supporting responsibility to all of the fifteen Emergency Support Functions (ESFs). The 
ESFs are the structure for coordinating federal interagency support for Incidents of 
National Significance.94 The ESFs coordinate the federal assistance under specific 
mission areas.  This allows a framework to identify which agencies will be asked to 
provide support under a specific mission area.  Since DoD is tasked to provide assistance 
under all fifteen ESFs, DoD organizations must be prepared to respond to all fifteen 
mission areas.  Figure 5 provides a summary of all fifteen ESFs and the primary agency 
charged with responsibility to provide and coordinate these functions.  The purpose of 
this chart is not to reiterate information available in the plan, but to point out the vast 
spectrum of mission areas for which  DoD can be tasked to provide support. 
 
93 United States, Office of Homeland Security, The National Response Plan (Washington, DC: Office 
of Homeland Security, 2004): 37, http://www.hsdl.org/homesec/docs/dhs/nps22-053106-03.pdf (Accessed 
September 1, 2006). 
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ESF Scope Primary 
Agency 
ESF # 1 
Transportation 
Federal and civil transportation support 
Transportation safety 
Restoration/recovery of transportation infrastructure 
Movement restrictions 
Damage and impact assessment 
DOT 
ESF # 2 
Communications 
Coordination with telecommunications industry 
Restoration/repair of telecommunications infrastructure 
 Protection, restoration, and sustainment of national cyber and 
information technology resources 
DHS 
ESF # 3 Public Works  
and Engineering 
Infrastructure protection and emergency repair 
Infrastructure restoration 
Engineering services, construction management 
Critical infrastructure liaison 
DoD/USACE 
ESF # 4 Fire Fighting Firefighting activities on federal lands 
Resource support to rural and urban firefighting operations USDA 
ESF # 5 Emergency 
 Management 
Coordination of incident management efforts 
Issuance of mission assignments 
Resource and human capital 
Incident action planning 
Financial management 
DHS/FEMA 
ESF # 6 Mass Care,  






ESF # 7 Resource 
Support 
Resource support (facility space, office equipment and 
supplies, contracting services, etc.) GSA 
ESF # 8 Public Health 
and Medical Services 
Public health 
Medical 
Mental health services 
Mortuary services 
HHS 
ESF # 9 Urban Search  
and Rescue 
Life-saving assistance 
Urban search and rescue DHS/FEMA 
ESF # 10 Oil and  
Hazardous Material 
Response 
Oil and hazardous materials (chemical, biological, radiological, 
etc.) response 
Environmental safety and short- and long-term cleanup 
EPA 
ESF # 11 Agriculture 
and Natural Resources 
Nutrition assistance 
Animal and plant disease/pest response 
Food safety and security 
Natural and cultural resources and historic properties 
protection and restoration 
USDA 
ESF # 12 Energy Energy infrastructure assessment, repair, and restoration 
Energy industry utilities coordination 
Energy forecast 
DOE 
ESF # 13 Public Safety 
and Security 
Facility and resource security 
Security planning and technical and resource assistance 
Public safety/security support 





                                                                                                                                                 
94 United States, Office of Homeland Security, The National Response Plan, 11. 
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ESF # 14 Long Term  
Community Recovery 
and Mitigation 
Social and economic community impact assessment 
Long-term community recovery assistance to States, local 
governments, and the private sector 
Mitigation analysis and program implementation 
DHS/FEMA 
ESF # 15 External 
Affairs 
Emergency public information and protective action guidance 
Media and community relations 
Congressional and international affairs 
Tribal and insular affairs 
 
DHS 
   
Figure 5.   ESFs Identified in NRP. 95 
 
It is important to note that, in the third column in this chart, DoD is not identified 
as a Primary Agency (PA) to any of the fifteen ESFs. Therefore, every request to support 
these Primary Agencies in the execution of the ESFs would have to follow the procedures 
identified in the vignettes studied in Chapter III. Since DoD is not directly assigned the 
responsibility or Primary Agency for any of these ESFs, almost all DoD responses to 
these functions are conducted via contingency or ad hoc planning, and require detailed 
coordination for sourcing and mobilization of forces and assets. Contingency sourcing 
means that forces and capabilities are not readily available, trained, or equipped for this 
particular mission; units, therefore,  are sourced via contingency process that will identify 
the most readily available and prepared units for the mission. Chapter V will address how 
DoD can overcome the contingency ad hoc sourcing process.  
Although Chapter III made it clear that the approval process is slow and 
cumbersome, the challenge does not lie solely in the approval process, but also in the 
timely and effective notification, preparation, deployment, and employment of military 
capabilities in support of these emergency functions. The Center for Strategic and 
International Studies stated in July of 2006 in its study, The Future of The National 
Guard and Reserves: The Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Phase Three Report, that DoD, as 
currently organized, “lacks a structured and orderly process to flow military capabilities 
rapidly to the areas that need them most.”96 Figure 6 depicts the time required to move 
troops into the Joint Operation Area during Hurricane Katrina operations.   
 
                                                 
95 United States, Office of Homeland Security, The National Response Plan, 12. 
96 Wormuth et al., The Future of the National Guard and Reserves. 
  
 
Figure 6.   Buildup of Forces Supporting Hurricane Katrina Operations. 97 
 
Although the DoD response to Hurricane Katrina is a poor model to follow 
because of the political ramblings that slowed the federal response, it highlighted some 
practical implications of DoD’s limited approach to civil support missions, despite being 
“…the largest, fastest deployment of military forces for a civil support mission in our 
nation's history.”98 An analysis of Figure 6 can infer that it took ten days from the outset 
of the catastrophic event before DoD had an appropriate level of troops to accomplish the 
DSCA mission requirements levied by the National Response Plan Request for 
Assistance and DoD Request for Forces processes. These processes require such an 
extensive validation, approval and execution procedure that it might delay the effective 
employment of military assets for up to ten days.  Furthermore, it can be argued that a 
catastrophic event like Katrina is not typical of the most challenging civil support 
scenario DoD may face in the future. “Katrina announced herself in advance, there were 
                                                 
97 Government Accountability Office, Hurricane Katrina: Better Plans and Exercises Needed to 
Guide the Military’s Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters, GAO-06-643: May 2006, 21 
98 See testimony of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense Paul McHale before the 
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Hearing on The Defense 
Department's Role In Hurricane Katrina Response, February 9, 2006. 
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no other major events taking place inside the United States, and the hurricane did not 
involve a weapon of mass destruction.”99 The scenarios analyzed in Chapter III can 
present greater challenges to a DoD civil support response, since they can require 
assistance in a broader geographical area and pose a contamination threat to the response 
forces.  
C. EMACS WILL NOT SOLVE THE PROBLEM  
The analysis of the Request for Assistance process stated that when any incident 
occurs, response begins at local jurisdictions. If local responders are overwhelmed, 
resources are requested from the state level through the state Emergency Operations 
Center. Once state National Guard capabilities have been exhausted, the State 
Coordinating Officer will enable any Emergency Management Agreement Compacts 
(EMAC) arrangements the affected state may have with neighboring states, for the use of 
their National Guard or civilian capabilities.  
The Emergency Management Assistance Compact is a congressionally ratified 
organization that provides a framework for interstate mutual aid.100 Through EMAC, a 
disaster-impacted state can request and receive assistance from other member states 
quickly and efficiently through a governor-declared state of emergency. The EMAC 
legislation solves the problems of liability and responsibilities of cost, since the affected 
state will be responsible for reimbursement of the cost of the response.101     
EMAC agreements also govern the use of other state National Guard assets and 
forces.  Under this agreement National Guard forces of a supporting state can be 
deployed to support and affected state and would be placed under the command and 
control of the Adjutant General (TAG) of the affected state’s National Guard.102  
 
99 Wormuth et al., The Future of the National Guard and Reserves, 67.  
100 Emergency Management Assistance Compact website, http://www.emacweb.org/ (Accessed July 
1, 2007). 
101 Ibid. 
102 Wormuth et al., The Future of the National Guard and Reserves, 75. 
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The EMAC process is a practical concept that creates a Guard network of civil 
support capabilities.  Unfortunately, Guard capabilities are leveraged in the same way as 
Title 10 assets are for DoD global missions. Therefore, National Guard capabilities are 
not always resident in state garrisons but may be deployed to the Middle East in support 
of Operation Iraqi Freedom or Operation Enduring Freedom.103  
The gap in available National Guard capabilities is evident in weekly reports of 
hurricane state preparedness provided to the National Guard Bureau Directorate of 
Operations by the Adjutant Generals of each state.  Figure 7 depicts the National Guard 
capabilities the State of Louisiana has identified as a requirement. The chart depicts 
available capabilities classified by the category of the hurricane in question. The color 
scheme depicts the preparedness level, with green meaning the state has the assets 
required for that category of hurricane, and red meaning the assets are not available. The 
right side of the chart depicts the support capabilities that will be required by the state 
EMAC and which state will provide the support.   
A category 4 or 5 hurricane will produce the greatest level of devastation and, 
therefore, will probably require a more extensive DoD civil support mission.  
Unfortunately, as seen in Figure 7, when DoD capabilities will be needed the most, the 
EMAC process is incapable of providing the assets the affected state will require.  
Furthermore, the EMAC framework is based on providing support from neighboring 
states, thereby expediting the arrival of assistance and maintaining the DoD assets under 
the operational control of the TAG and the governor.  In a catastrophic disaster like the 
scenarios studied in Chapter III, it is possible that the neighboring states will also be 
affected by the catastrophic incident, and therefore in need of assistance themselves. 
Furthermore, the state infrastructure may be incapable of providing command and 
control, logistical support, and sustainment for EMAC capabilities, based on the 
devastation of the catastrophic incident.  A review of other hurricane state slides also 
finds similar issues when facing catastrophic hurricane scenarios. 
 
103 Pauline Vo, “Have National Guard Deployments in Iraq Eroded States' Disaster Response 
Capability?” Pew Research Center Publications, stateline.org, May 2007, 
http://pewresearch.org/pubs/476/national-guard-disaster-response (Accessed June 12, 2007). 
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The EMAC process highlights the interdependencies of state civil support 
requirements. Although states depend on each other for the success of the EMAC 
process, this dependency can be leveraged more efficiently to ensure that a wider range 
of state partners can enjoy the benefits of EMACS. Chapter V will explain how the 
recommended framework can leverage EMAC type capabilities to a wider range of states 
while freeing up other EMAC resources for warfighter needs.  This concept will be the 
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104 NGB J3 Hurricane State Preparation VTC, Power Point Brief, June 2007. 
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D.  CURRENT DOD INITIATIVES TO IMPROVE DSCA RESPONSE     
Numerous national-level strategy and policy documents have addressed a need for 
DoD to take a more proactive approach to DSCA response operations.  As early as 1997 
the National Defense Panel ascertained that DoD should focus efforts to “… provide 
forces organized and equipped for training of civil agencies and the immediate 
reinforcement of first-response efforts in domestic emergencies. They would focus on 
management of the consequences of a terrorist attack (to include weapons of mass 
destruction) and natural disasters.”105 After the September 11 attacks DoD efforts in 
DSCA operations took on renewed urgency. The Department of Defense Strategy for 
Homeland Defense and Civil Support, published in June 2005, noted that “the nation 
needs to focus particular attention on better utilizing the competencies of the National 
Guard and Reserve Component organizations.”106 Following the DSCA operations in 
support of Hurricane Katrina, there has been yet another exigency for organization and 
development of DoD DSCA operations. The DoD Homeland Defense and Civil Support 
Strategy makes clear that DoD will play a key role in responding to events here at home, 
“when directed by the president or the secretary of defense,” using “military force and 
DoD capabilities designed for use in expeditionary war fighting missions.”107  
Since Hurricane Katrina, refinement of the DSCA mission has been led by 
NORTHCOM and has followed continuous progression. Many of these efforts have been 
guided by the recommendations of the report on the Federal Response to Hurricane 
Katrina: Lessons Learned. The next few paragraphs will summarize the latest initiatives 
in the realm of DSCA operations aimed at improving and expediting the Request for 




105 National Defense Panel, Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century, December 
1997, 54–55.  
106 Department of Defense, Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, June 2005, 37–38.  
107 Ibid., 19. 
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1.  DCOs Assigned to FEMA Regional Offices 
In response to the Katrina lessons learned report recommendation number four; 
“DHS should develop and implement Homeland Security Regions that are fully staffed, 
trained, and equipped to manage and coordinate all preparedness activities and any 
emergency that may require a substantial federal response,”108 DoD has collocated a 
single point of contact at all FEMA regional offices.  This position is now permanently 
staffed by a National Guard colonel who serves as the Defense Coordinating Officer 
(DCO) during domestic response incidents. For a small-scale DoD response, the 
Commander of USNORTHCOM can designate the DCO as a Joint Force Commander 
(JFC).109 In this capacity, the DCO can provide command and control (C2) for the entire 
DSCA effort as long as the response force does not exceed the DCO’s C2 capability.110  
However, other than a small administrative staff known as the Defense Coordinating 
Element (DCE) the DCO does not have any troops to accomplish the DSCA mission until 
the Request for Assistance or Request for Forces process has been completed. Although 
the DCO is key to facilitating this process, his position has minimal impact in the rapid 
deployment and employment of military capabilities in response to a Request for 
Assistance. 
2. Base Support Installations and Operational Staging Areas 
In response to the Katrina Lessons learned report recommendation number 21 (a): 
“DHS should coordinate with other federal agencies and states to identify physical 
locations around the country that could be used as crisis support centers or bases for 
receiving, staging, and integrating emergency management resources during 
disasters,”111 DoD has identified procedures for the use of military installations as Base 
 
108 The White House, Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned (Washington, DC: 
The White House, 2006), 89. 
109 U.S. Department of Defense, Directive 3025.15, Military Assistance to Civil Authorities 
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 18 February 1997): vi (Under revision: will be re-issued 
under the name Defense Support of Civil Authorities). 
110 Ibid., vi. 
111 The White House, Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina, 94. 
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Support Installations (BSI). When directed, the military services will provide installations 
based on Service Components nomination of appropriate installations as BSIs.112 
However, BSIs provide military-to-military support to DoD assets only.113 If FEMA 
requires DoD support for a logistical mobilization center, it will need to follow the 
request process. Although the BSIs are intended for military-to-military support only, this 
process has alerted the services to the potential for the use of their facilities as a FEMA 
operational staging or mobilization area.  Despite this being a step in the right direction, 
DoD has not provided any guidance for the services or installation commanders to 
prepare specific FEMA support plans. Therefore, in the event of a BSI being used as a 
FEMA mobilization center, all interactions will be ad hoc and unrehearsed unless this 
specific installation has previously participated in a DSCA national-level exercise 
(Ardent Sentry, Vigilant Shield). 
3. Joint Staff Standing DSCA Execute Order 
In response to Katrina lessons learned report recommendation number 24; “DoD 
and DHS should plan and prepare for a significant DoD supporting role during a 
catastrophic event,”114 DoD has implemented a significant initiative.   
This initiative has been guided by the development of the chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Standing Defense Support of Civil Authorities Execute Order or 
CJCS Standing DSCA EXORD.  This EXORD expands the NORTHCOM commander’s 
authority. It enables DoD to lean forward and initiate DSCA response preparations 
without having statutory authority, such as a Stafford Act declaration. The EXORD 
organizes DoD response to a domestic incident in a three-tier framework that allows DoD 
to push forces or capabilities forward before the Request for Assistance staffing process 
is complete.115
 
112 U.S. Department of Defense, Directive 3025.15, Military Assistance to Civil Authorities. 
113 Ibid, 7. 
114 The White House, Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina, 94. 
115 Department of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Defense Support of Civil Authorities 
Execute Order (Washington, DC: June 2007) 6. 
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A summary of the key provisions of the 2007 CJCS Standing DSCA EXORD is 
provided below: 
 
1) Tier 1 (Assigned Capabilities):116 The commander USNORTHCOM has authority to 
deploy Tier 1 forces and can employ them upon an approved Request for Assistance 
and notification of SECDEF:  
a) DCO / DCE w/augmentation 
b) Commander’s Assessment Element (assesses damage and provides 
recommendations for capability requirements) 
c) Task Force or Joint Task Force Headquarters (provides Command and Control 
capabilities for follow on forces) 
 
2) Tier 2 (Pre-Identified Capabilities):117 The commander USNORTHCOM can place 
these pre-identified capabilities on a twenty-four-hour Prepare To Deploy Order 
(PTDO) and can deploy and employ them upon an approved Request for Assistance 
and notification of SECDEF:  
a) DoD Installations – Federal Operational Staging Areas, Mobilization Centers, 
BSIs 
b) Modular Airborne Fire Fighting Systems (8) 
c) Rotary Wing Support:  Medium (8) / Heavy (4) 
d) Communications Support Packages (three sizes) 
e) Fixed Wing Search Aircraft (1 – P3C) 
f) Patient Movement Capability to support evacuation (capable of evacuating 
five hundred patients in twenty-four hours) 
g) DoD Civilian Firefighters 
h) EMEDS (Forward Surgical Team) 
i) USTRANSCOM and Defense Logistic Agency personnel to support a 
Deployable Distribution Operations Center (elements of a JTF-PO discussed 
in Chapter III) 
 
3) Tier 3 (Large Scale Event Capabilities):118 The commander USNORTHCOM can 
plan on using these forces however the Prepare to Deploy Order can not be given 
                                                 
116 Department of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Defense Support of Civil Authorities, 
7. 
117 Ibid., 8.  
118 Ibid., 10. 
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until a validated Request for Assistance is approved. Furthermore, deployment and 
employment requires SECDEF approval:  
a) Catastrophic / Large Scale Initial Entry Force (includes one Ground Brigade / 
approx seventy-five hundred troops)  
b) Incident, Awareness and Assessment Packages (Authorizes the use of 
traditional intelligence capabilities for non-intelligence purposes in support of 
DSCA missions in accordance with the exemptions to the Posse Comitatus 
Act) 
c) Joint Personnel Recovery Center Package (Conducts joint air rescue 
operations, coordinates, and de-conflicts with other federal, state, and local 
rescue agencies) 
Note: There are numerous other capabilities in this tier, however, the three 
mentioned above constitute the bulk of the assets added in this tier. 
 
Although the CJCS Standing DSCA EXORD allows the NORTHCOM 
commander more leeway and autonomy in DSCA operations it does not accelerate the 
Request for Assistance or the Request for Forces processes, it requires they be completed 
following the normal process, before sourcing units and issuing prepare to deploy orders. 
Furthermore, The CJCS EXORD clearly states that Tier 3 forces will not be sourced 
before an approved Request for Assistance is processed and it further allows up to 
twenty-four hours for JDOMs to source these forces.119 Tier 2 forces have twenty-four 
hours to report prepared to deploy once they have been notified by the supported 
commander and Tier 3 forces have ninety-six hours upon notification of SECDEF 
approval.120 An analysis of this timeline identifies that Tier 1 and Tier 2 forces can 
potentially be available and/or employed in DSCA operations in less than forty-eight 
hours however Tier 3 forces will require a minimum of 120 hours before employment 
(adding twenty-four hours for a Request for Assistance administrative process to work 
from the local first responder that needs the assistance to the SECDEF for approval and 
mobilization to affected area and assuming the JDOMS sourcing process will be 
instantaneous). This analysis asserts that in a catastrophic hurricane disaster situation, 
where preparation can be initiated prior to an event, the CJCS Standing DSCA EXORD 
 




                                                
can be an effective DoD response framework. Unfortunately in an un-announced 
catastrophic scenario, like the ones studied in Chapter III, the CJCS EXORD will require 
five days to have an appropriate level of DoD forces employed in essential DSCA 
operations. The CJCS Standing DSCA EXORD process highlights that if DSCA 
requirements can be pre-planned and pre-coordinated the response process is expedited. 
Therefore, NORTHCOM has been working with JDOMS and FEMA to develop a set of 
Pre-Scripted Mission Assignments (PSMA).  
4. Pre-Scripted Mission Assignments 
The PSMAs expedite the validation and coordination of Mission Assignments by 
pre-coordinating requests for specific capabilities. For these specific capabilities the 
scope, dollar amount, and details are worked out with FEMA beforehand.121 This allows 
the Defense Coordinating Officer to have a pre-coordinated plan sitting on the shelf that 
can be quickly validated and submitted to the Joint Director of Military Support for 
SECDEF approval. Furthermore, the mission execution can be planned beforehand. 
Figure 8 provides a list of twenty-five mission areas that have been identified as PSMAs. 
An additional twenty-eight PSMAs have been coordinated between FEMA and the US 
Army Corps of Engineers. 
PSMAs are probably the only DSCA development since Hurricane Katrina that 
can actually expedite portions of the Request for Assistance process. Unfortunately, 
PSMAs do nothing to accelerate the DoD approval, sourcing, deployment, and 
employment of capabilities. Furthermore, the CJCS Standing DSCA EXORD states that 
“deployment of assigned assets in support of DSCA must not interfere with the primary 
DoD mission unless otherwise directed by the president or SECDEF.”122 This statement 
clearly allows DoD an avenue to not source capabilities required under PSMA 
agreements if they are needed for a “primary DoD mission.” The DoD does source a  
 
 
121 FEMA, Development of Pre-Scripted Mission Assignments, FEMA website, 
http://www.fema.gov/media/archives/2007/061207.shtm (Accessed April 15, 2007). 
122 Department of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Defense Support of Civil Authorities, 
7. 
limited amount of forces that are trained in civil support missions.  These forces are 
predominantly prepared to respond to Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and 




Figure 8.   Pre-Scripted Mission Assignments. 123 
 
5.  CSTs, CCMRFs, and CERFPs 
The National Guard has led DoD in the sourcing and training of forces for civil 
support missions. The weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams (WMD-CSTs) 
are the best prepared, trained, and equipped forces in the DoD for civil support missions. 
The WMD-CSTs consist of specialized units designed to assist first responders in 
detecting the presence of chemical, biological, or nuclear materials and support the 
development of appropriate consequence management decisions.124 These units were  
 
                                                 
123 Don Reed, Pre-Scripted Mission Assignments (2007 National Emergency Preparedness Liaison 
Officers Conference, February 2007), Power Point presentation, slide 4. 
124 Wormuth et al., The Future of the National Guard and Reserves, 71. 
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developed by DoD only after they were mandated by Congress in 1998. By the end of 
fiscal year 2007, every state in the country should have a WMD-CST that is trained and 
equipped for this mission.125  
The National Guard has also developed specialized CBRNE units called CBRNE 
Enhanced Response Force Packages (CERFPs). These units consist of approximately one 
hundred twenty-five troops that can provide medical triage, mass decontamination, and 
search and rescue in contaminated areas.126 Congress has authorized seventeen of these 
packages to be located in each FEMA region, plus one in Hawaii and one in West 
Virginia, near the National Capital Region (NCR).127   
Additionally, DoD is developing a predominantly active duty Title 10 CBRNE 
Consequence Management Response Force (CCMRF). These units would be capable of 
providing CBRNE, medical, and support units that are organized into three task forces 
with a total of approximately thirty-six hundred troops.128 These forces would report to 
Joint Task Force Civil Support and fall under the command and control of the 
NORTHCOM commander.  
WMD and CBRNE efforts are an outstanding example of specialized capabilities 
that DoD can leverage for civil support operations.  Unfortunately, CST, CERFP and 
CCMRF forces do not receive any significant specialized civil support training for these 
missions.129  Furthermore, they are not focused exclusively on these missions for any 
specified period of time therefore they are susceptible to deployments in support of 
warfighting efforts.130  Additionally, even when activated for DSCA operations they do 
 
125 Wormuth et al., The Future of the National Guard and Reserves, 70. 
126 Ibid., 72. 
127 Ibid., 72. 
128 Chris Hornbarger, Katrina Lessons-Learned: National Contingency Planning for Domestic 
Incidents, September 23, 2005 Memorandum, 
http://www.dean.usma.edu/sosh/Academic_Program/Courses/ss493/LESSONS/Military Role in Homeland 
Security/Memo_DoD-DHS_Cooperation.pdf  (Accessed May 1, 2007). 
129 Wormuth et al., The Future of the National Guard and Reserves, 71. 
130 Ibid., 70. 
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not have any organic airlift capabilities therefore their employment is slowed by their 
dependence on Request for Forces for airlift support.131
E.  CONCLUSION 
1.  Current Efforts are Not Supported by an Efficient Framework 
NORTHCOM led efforts to prepare for domestic incidents are laudable yet 
insufficient since they do not have an efficient framework to support them. The CJCS 
Standing DSCA EXORD, Pre-Scripted Mission Assignments, and CBRNE Consequence 
Management Response Forces are all prudent planning efforts to enable a DoD response 
to multiple and/or simultaneous events. In spite of these efforts, the analysis to this point 
has highlighted that, despite being the only federal department capable of mobilizing a 
massive support network to respond to a catastrophic event,132 the “military has not 
organized, trained, or equipped its active or reserve forces to reflect civil support as a 
priority mission.”133  The creation of USNORTHCOM without assigned forces requires 
the combatant commander responsible for DSCA to request forces after the event 
requiring the forces has occurred. Furthermore, the National Response Plan not assigning 
DoD lead responsibilities for any of the fifteen Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) 
keeps DoD from planning a framework that can immediately support any of the ESFs 
since they are not responsible for its execution. Additionally, the refusal of the CJCS 
Standing DSCA EXORD to source forces prior to an approved Request for Assistance 
points to a DoD doctrinal reluctance to accept civil support missions as a force structure 
requisite. 
2.  Way Ahead 
Although Lieutenant General Inge, former deputy commander of NORTHCOM, 
stated at a March 2006 Senate hearing that NORTHCOM “stands ready to assist primary 
 
131 Wormuth et al., The Future of the National Guard and Reserves, 71. 
132 With the exception of some limited CCMRF capabilities discussed earlier in this chapter. 
133 Wormuth et al., The Future of the National Guard and Reserves, 65. 
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agencies in responding quickly to man-made and natural disasters as directed,”134 much 
work remains to be done before NORTHCOM has forces available, trained and equipped 
to effectively coordinate a DoD response to a domestic catastrophic event of the scope of 
the scenarios studied in Chapter III. 
The next chapter will recommend a framework of DoD support to civilian 
agencies that can best leverage DoD capabilities and resources for DSCA missions. This 
framework will require DoD to re-structure forces and properly train and equip them for 
these missions. This chapter will provide recommendations on how to apply this concept 
to national policy and DoD directives to clarify the use of military forces in domestic 
incidents.  
 
134 Lieutenant General Joseph Inge, Testimony before the Emerging Threats and Capabilities 
Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee, March 10, 2006.  
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V. SUCCESS REQUIRES CHANGE 
The Department of Defense should recognize civil support, particularly in 
response to a catastrophic event, as a central mission for which it must 
plan, program and budget. 
   — Commission on the National Guard and Reserve, May 2007 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
To recap the argument thus far, this review of the Request for Assistance and the 
Request for Forces processes concluded that the current mechanism for requesting, 
validating, and approving the use of DoD assets and capabilities is inherently slow and 
ineffective. Furthermore, along with the less-than-efficient approval process, military 
forces and capabilities are not postured for a timely and effective notification, 
preparation, deployment, and employment to a civil support response.  
The problem, however, is not due necessarily to impediments to military 
operations from civilian authorities.  As argued in Chapter II, current legal and statutory 
guidelines for military civil support missions provide a framework for working 
constructively with state and local jurisdictions. Rather than recommending that civil 
support operations be centralized under DoD control, the military pieces of the civil 
support puzzle need to be reorganized and restructured to accomplish this mission 
effectively. This chapter expands on that argument by presenting a framework for 
improvement in a critical element in the military role — that of validating the use of 
military forces as well as preparing a DoD effective response system. 
B.  TWO-STEP PROCESS 
This thesis has outlined the military civil support process into two distinct steps.  
The first step is the Request for Assistance and Request for Forces processes or request, 
validation and approval step.  The second step is the execution step or preparation, 
notification, deployment, and employment step. 
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1.  Step 1 Changes 
Although the Defense Coordinating Officer provides a DoD contribution to how 
the Request for Assistance process works, the military cannot control the “who, what, 
when, and where” of the request process.  The Request for Assistance process, while 
complex, ensures the statutory jurisdictions of state and local authorities.  In step 1, DoD 
can only control the validation process of the assistance request and the internal DoD 
approval process for the request.  The problem is, that in controlling its own processes, 
DoD has not yet fully incorporated the needs of civilian support into its plans. 
DoD’s control of the validation process traditionally uses the criteria of legality, 
lethality, risk, cost, appropriateness, and readiness to validate requests for DoD support. 
To some extent, these criteria give greater weight to established military missions.  For 
instance, the CJCS Standing DSCA EXORD affirms that “deployment of assigned assets 
in support of DSCA must not interfere with the primary DoD mission unless otherwise 
directed by the president or SECDEF.”135
In its evolving homeland defense role, however, new criteria may need to be 
developed. as civil support becomes an equal DoD priority.  The NORTHCOM 
commander, General Victor Renuart, recently argued for this higher placement of civil 
support in the priorities list.  At a recent Senate hearing, the general argued that 
“…disasters of significant magnitude have the potential to considerably interrupt 
governmental operations and emergency services to such an extent that national security 
could be threatened.”136 If natural or manmade disasters can threaten national security, 
DoD has a responsibility and duty, as the nation’s protectors, to be prepared to utilize 
military capabilities to both deny a threat and to mitigate its consequences. The current 
DoD Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support also affirms that securing the 
U.S. homeland is “the first among many priorities.”137
 
135 Department of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Defense Support of Civil Authorities 
Execute Order (Washington, DC: June 2007), 7. 
136 General Victor Renuart, Commander U.S. Northern Command, Statement before the Senate 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, July 19, 2007, 7. 
137 Wormuth et al., The Future of the National Guard and Reserves, 78.  
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If DoD is to fully embrace the homeland defense mission, the validation criteria 
described above and outlined in DoDD 3025.15 need to be modified to reflect civil 
support missions.  A new DoD framework would establish a process that satisfies both 
warfighter and civil support needs.  
The National Strategy for Aviation Security (NSAS), published in March 2007, 
recognized this need for a more appropriate set of criteria, but it was limited to the 
military’s support role in an Air Domain emergency. The NSAS established a set of five 
criteria to be used by any agency or department that has a response role in this domain:138  
• Existing law  
• Desired outcome  
• Response capabilities required  
• Asset availability  
• Authority to act  
 
These criteria are applied across all responders to guide the Primary Agency in 
deciding what agency is best suited to accomplish a specific role.  These criteria aid the 
Primary Agency in maximizing the use of capabilities across all federal departments and 
agencies by focusing the decision on the effectiveness of a capability to achieve a desired 
outcome, rather than restricting action that is based on an assumed risk, cost, or 
subjective judgment of appropriateness.139
The National Response Plan would benefit from incorporating this new set of 
criteria.  Modeled after the National Strategy for Aviation Security, the Principal Federal 
Official would be able to decide what agency should respond and with what capabilities. 
Furthermore, DoD should cease using the current validation criteria and allow the 
Principal Federal Official to make the decision to use military capabilities for civil 
support missions based on the threat scenario and the outcome desired. This change in  
| 
 
138 Department of Homeland Security, National Strategy for Aviation Security (Washington, DC: 
March 2007) 23, http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/aviation-security.html (Accessed May 5, 2007). 
139 Ibid., 23. 
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policy does not require DoD to relinquish command and control of military forces.  It 
simply allows the Principal Federal Official to expedite the decision process to use a 
certain capability.  
If DoD is not willing to delegate this authority to a Principal Federal Official, it 
should at least limit its decision criteria to legality and readiness. The issue of legality in 
the use of military forces in domestic incidents stems from misinterpretations of the 
Posse Comitatus Act. Legality should be measured against the exceptions to the Act that 
were outlined earlier in this thesis.  Furthermore, the recent changes to the Insurrection 
Act or Enforcement of the Laws to Restore Public Order (ELRPO) also highlight 
concerns with respect to the legality of the use of military forces and capabilities for civil 
support missions.  If the president, for instance, invokes the authorities granted to his 
office under ELRPO, he may provide supplies, services, and equipment: to the extent 
state authorities are unable; may only act until the state is able; and may only act to the 
extent it does not interfere with military operations.140
Readiness is also key.  At a hearing before the Senate Committee on Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs, Pete Verga, acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Homeland Defense and Americas Security Affairs (ASD/HD & ASA) stated, “DoD, at 
the direction of the president or the secretary of defense, as appropriate and consistent 
with the law and the imperative to maintain military readiness, will provide critical 
CBRNE consequence management support to civil authorities as part of the 
comprehensive national response to a CBRNE incident.”141  Mr. Verga’s reference to the 
“imperative to maintain military readiness” is directly associated with the definition of 
the readiness criteria provided in DoDD 3025.15. According to this DoD directive, 
readiness is the consideration of the implications of authorizing and undertaking a 
domestic support mission on the warfighting capabilities of the force.142
 
140  United States Congress, John Warner Defense Authorization Act of 2007. 
141 Peter Verga, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas Security 
Affairs, Statement before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, July 
19,2007, 2–3. 
142 U.S. Department of Defense, Directive 3025.15, Military Assistance to Civil Authorities 
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, February 18, 1997) 3 (Under revision; will be re-issued 
under the name Defense Support of Civil Authorities). 
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As crucial as this focus on readiness is, however, it implies that warfighter 
readiness outweighs domestic civil support, even when the latter directly results from a 
level of damage that rises to the level of a risk to national security.  The new homeland 
defense and civil support mission is now well-documented and challenges this apparent 
policy priority dilemma.  DoD’s reluctance to accept civil support as a central mission 
stands in opposition to numerous national policy analyses and directives.143  Readiness as 
criteria for the use of military forces in a domestic incident should be redefined to 
facilitate, rather than impede, support to civilian authorities.  Criteria should be used that 
evaluate the readiness or preparedness of military forces to effectively employ 
capabilities in domestic incidents — instead of serving as a barrier to employment in the 
homeland due to risk of sacrificing combat readiness. If readiness was used in this 
context, DoD would structure forces in a manner that would prepare them for service in 
combat operations overseas as well as domestic incidents in the homeland. Such 
preparation would lead to a substantial restructuring of military planning and force 
deployment. 
2. Step 2 Changes 
In March 2006, the latest report on the Commission on the National Guard and 
Reserves stated that "although the current DoD strategy for homeland defense and civil 
support affirms that securing the U.S. homeland is “the first among many priorities,” 
DoD in fact has not accepted that this responsibility requires planning, programming and 
budgeting for civil support missions."144 Planning, programming and budgeting are 
essential requirements in the preparation and readiness of military forces to provide 
assistance to civil authorities in domestic events. The budgeting piece of this puzzle is 
outside the scope of this thesis, and is one area that requires further study.  For the 
purposes of this analysis, military and congressional leaders would realign the defense 
 
143 General Victor Renuart, Commander U.S. Northern Command, Statement before the Senate 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, July 19, 2007, 3–4. 
144 Wormuth et al., The Future of the National Guard and Reserves, 78.  
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budget to support a redesigned planning and programming model that can improve the 
structure of military forces to provide DSCA.   
C. NEW MILITARY FORCE STRUCTURE 
Earlier chapters in this thesis contained a review of the mission and composition 
of DSCA EXORD Tier 1–3 forces, CST, CCMRFs, CERFPs, and several other military 
dual purpose forces like the JTF-PO.  Common to all these efforts was the lack of a 
requirement for these forces to receive specific training for civil support missions, as well 
as the requirement for these forces to be equipped and able to respond in a timely 
manner. The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) latest report on the 
Commission on the National Guard and Reserve, as well as the RAND Corporation 
report, Hurricane Katrina, Lessons for Army Planning and Operations, have recently 
called for a restructuring of military capabilities to meet these civil support missions.   
Central to these recommendations for change is a focus on a regional framework 
for military support to civil authorities.145  This regional framework would allow for 
military capabilities to train with local first responders in their areas of responsibility as 
well as spread DoD CBRNE capabilities across the homeland in an effort to posture them 
for a quicker response. This suggested regional framework would be similar to the 
current EMAC process, which highlights the interdependencies of state civil support 
requirements. Although states depend on each other for the success of the EMAC 
process, this dependency can be leveraged more efficiently to ensure that a wider range 
of state partners can enjoy the benefits of an EMAC-like civil support structure. The 
CSIS and RAND models are the basis for our recommended framework. In the following 
paragraphs we will explain how our recommended framework can leverage EMAC-type 
capabilities to a wider range of states while freeing up other EMAC resources for 
warfighter needs.  This concept will be the basis of our recommended framework. 
 
 
145 For a more detailed description of these regional frameworks, see Wormuth et al., The future of the 
National Guard and Reserves, Washington, DC: CSIS, July 2006, 74 and Davis et al., Hurricane Katrina, 
Lessons for Army Planning and Operations (Washington, DC: RAND, January 2007):. 54–58. 
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1. The CSIS Model 
The Center for Strategic and International Studies report recommends that 
National Guard units be postured under the control of regional state joint force 
headquarters in ten regional Civil Support Forces to match the ten FEMA regions across 
the country.146 This concept would draw forces and capabilities only from the National 
Guard and Reserve forces.147 This report recommends these forces receive specific civil 
support training and exercise regularly for this mission. Furthermore, it recommends 
these forces be organized in three to four month alert windows where they would be 
available only for civil support missions and not eligible to deploy overseas.148 
Additionally, this model identifies a need for pre-identified airlift support to ensure 
deployment timelines can be met.149 Command and Control of these forces would be 
exercises by the state joint force headquarters, which would be under the command of the 
adjutant general of the state in which they are deployed.150
2. The RAND Model 
The RAND report also recommends a regional approach that utilizes National 
Guard forces in a regional taskforce construct with Civil Support Battalions (CSBs) that 
are trained for HLS missions.151 These battalions would be ready for deployment within 
eighteen hours of notification and would not be available for deployment overseas.152 
The RAND report recommends four alternatives for command and control: separate 
federal and state forces, dual status commanders, NORTHCOM in command of forces, 
and State Joint Force Headquarters TAGs in command of forces.153  
 
146 Wormuth et al., The Future of the National Guard and Reserves, 74. 
147 Ibid, 74–78. 
148 Ibid, 79. 
149 Ibid, 78. 
150 Ibid, 74. 
151 Davis et al., Hurricane Katrina, Lessons for Army Planning and Operations (Washington, DC: 
RAND, January 2007): 54. 
152 Ibid., 54. 
153 Ibid., 63–67. 
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3. Putting it all Together 
The RAND and CSIS models are a great first step in the development of DoD 
efforts to accept civil support as a critical mission requirement.  Unfortunately, they only 
focus on the structure of National Guard and Reserve forces to support these missions.  In 
our earlier analysis we highlighted that DoD support missions in catastrophic domestic 
events will require the deployment and employment of National Guard (CST and 
CCMRF), Reserves (medical and support forces), and active duty, Title 10 forces 
(CBIRF, JTF-PO). If there is to be an organized and coordinated training, equipping, 
notification, deployment and employment of these individual forces, they must be 
trained, equipped, and organized in a coordinated framework.   
D. INTEGRATED DOD EFFORT 
The model proposed here integrates the CSIS and RAND models with the EMAC 
and the Joint Staff Standing Defense Support of Civil Authorities Executive Order 
processes to incorporate the training and deployment of active duty Title 10 forces. This 
model is a compromise that will integrate the regionalization idea of the RAND model 
with the CSIS alert windows concept.  It is designed to work across the entire DoD force 
structure to ensure the military can effectively support all fifteen Emergency Support 
Functions identified in the National Response Plan and continue to expand the Pre-
Scripted Mission Assignment process. 
The United States Air Force (USAF) Air Expeditionary Force concept is the 
bedrock of this model’s framework. Doctor William Dowdy of the Air Force Research 
Institute quotes Richard G. Davis of the Air Force History and Museums Program in his 
analysis of Air Expeditionary Forces I–IV, Testing the Expeditionary Force Concept, as 
saying that “the painfully slow response to the outbreak of the Korean War led to the 
USAF’s first attempt to institutionalize a rapid response force.”154 The Air Force has 
been experimenting with organizing a force structure that can rapidly respond to 
 
154 William Dowdy, Testing the Expeditionary Force Concept: An Analysis of AEFs I – IV (1995-97) 
and the Way Ahead (Air University, Air Power Research Institute, 1999) 1, 
https://research.maxwell.af.mil/viewabstract.aspx?id=801 (Accessed June 1, 2007). 
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warfighter needs since the 1950s. Air Expeditionary Forces are defined by the USAF 
Scientific Advisory Board as “tailorable and rapidly employable air and space assets that 
provide the National Command Authority and the theater commanders-in-chief with 




1. Force Structure 
The proposed model would structure civil support capabilities across DoD’s force 
structure in a Civil Support Expeditionary Force (CSEF) framework.  Forces would be 
geographically separated by region, but operationally linked to a ninety-day rotational 
support alert window that can provide a rapid response to a domestic crisis.156  
Following this framework, National Guard, Reserve, and Title 10 forces that have 
resident civil support capabilities can be identified and operationally linked into an 
expeditionary force framework.  These forces would be geographically separated into 
regions across the country.  The Air Force divides their expeditionary efforts into 10 
AEFs that support ongoing operational efforts and two on-call AEFs to support pop-up 
contingencies.157  The ten AEFs construct provides the Air Force the ability to have one 
AEF actively deployed for a period of three months, eight AEFs in a training and 
preparation cycle (twenty-four months), and one AEF in a three-month stand down/rest 
cycle (following the deployed period). Civil support forces could be organized to follow 
the same cycle, where a CSEF would be on call/employed in a domestic incident scenario 
for a period of ninety days. Following that period, the CSEF would rotate to a three-
month stand down/ rest cycle and then fall into a twenty-four-month cycle that is split 
into three-month periods.  This framework would require these civil support forces to be 
organized into ten separate groups or “buckets of capabilities” to use former Chief of 
 
155 United States Air Force Scientific Advisory Board, Report on United States Air Expeditionary 
Forces 1: “Summary,” SAB-TR-97-01, November 1997,  vii. 
156 Idea derived from General Michael E. Ryan, Commander’s NOTAM 98-4, July 28, 1998, 
http://www.issues.af.mil/notam984.html (Accessed 1 August 2007). 
157 Ibid., 3. 
Staff of the Air Force General Michael Ryan’s terms.158 These buckets of capabilities 
would include CSTs, CCMRFs, CERFPs, JTF-POs, and other similar military units that 
can provide assistance in all fifteen Emergency Support Functions identified in the 
National Response Plan and the twenty-five Pre-Scripted Mission Assignments FEMA 
and DoD hope will expedite military assistance. Furthermore, they could be arranged into 
separate groups that can be organized to coincide with the ten FEMA regions. Therefore, 
they can train and exercise with their DHS counterparts during the twenty-four month 
training cycle. Figure 9 describes what the CSEF framework would look like if we 
followed the Air Force Air Expeditionary Force model. 





18 Month Training Cycle (Ops & 
DSCA)/War Fighter Deployments 
for Title 10 (12 Months), Guard 
units in 4 year no-deploy 
3 Month  
DSCA Prep 






Tier 1, Small 
Response 
DCO Leads
Tier 2, Medium 
Response JTF 
Established










Figure 9.   Concept Adopted from USAF AEF. 159 
 
The CSIS report identified a critical gap in all current civil support initiatives. For 
any framework or model that is followed (RAND model, CSIS model, JS DSCA 
EXORD, etc.) the civil support forces would need pre-identified airlift in order to deploy 
                                                 
158 General Michael E. Ryan, Commander’s NOTAM 98-4, July 28, 1998, 
http://www.issues.af.mil/notam984.html (Accessed 1 August 2007). 
159 William Dowdy, Testing the Expeditionary Force Concept: An Analysis of AEFs I – IV (1995-97) 
and the Way Ahead (Air University, Air Power Research Institute, 1999) 11, 
https://research.maxwell.af.mil/viewabstract.aspx?id=801 (Accessed June 1, 2007).  
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anywhere in the homeland within twelve to twenty-four hours.160 The Air Force AEF 
construct recognized this problem on the global scale as well.  To solve this issue, the Air 
Force designated five Lead Mobility Wings (LMWs)161 
 
within the ten AEF structure to 
support the airlift process on a rotating basis.  During the Hurricane Katrina response, the 
National Guard moved over thirteen thousand tons of supplies, equipment, and over 
thirty-three thousand personnel with their organic airlift capability.162 This effort was 
separate from the U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) organized airlift via 
the DoD Request for Forces process enabled by Air Mobility Command (AMC). Despite 
this, the active duty Air Force via AMC controls the majority of the DoD airlift capability 
and capacity; therefore, a National Guard-only airlift model for DSCA would not be 
sufficient to mobilize all forces and capabilities required for incidents of the magnitude of 
those studied in Chapter III. 
Since the Air Force maintains and operates the majority of the DoD airlift 
capabilities, the only way to ensure airlift is available for civil support missions is to have 
the Air Force place Mobility Wings on an alert rotation cycle that coincides with the 
CSEF cycle.  The CSIS report recommends this process and our analysis agrees with 
their recommendation. The CSIS report also recommends that the Civil Reserve Air Fleet 
(CRAF) process (civilian air fleet used in military deployments) be considered as an 
alternative to a civil support airlift possibility.163  
2. Training and Exercising (Readiness and Preparation) 
During the 24-month CSEF cycle depicted in Figure 9, units would train for 
warfighter operational needs as well as civil support mission needs, and would actively 
participate in HLS and HLD exercises — such as Ardent Sentry and Vigilant Shield — in 
 
160 Wormuth et al., The Future of the National Guard and Reserves, 78. 
161 Air Force Instruction (AFI) 10-400, October 1, 1999, 2. 
162 Wormuth et al., The Future of the National Guard and Reserves, 78. 
163 The CSIS reports quotes the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics, Defense Science Board 2003 Summer Study, DoD Roles and Missions in Homeland Security, 
May 2004, Volume II-A: Supporting Reports, 114, as recommending the CRAF agreement be re-negotiated 
to provide airlift for civil support missions. 
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order to sharpen their civil support skills.164 Despite numerous other civil support 
exercises, the primary DoD civil support exercises nationwide are Ardent Sentry and 
Vigilant Shield.  These exercises follow an annual cycle with Ardent Sentry occurring 
every spring and Vigilant Shield every fall. In a twenty-four-month period, there would 
be four separate opportunities for these eight CSEFs to participate in civil support 
exercises. This pattern would allow a schedule that requires the participation of two 
CSEFs in every exercise. CSEF participation in these exercises could be arranged within 
three-to-six months of the CSEF entering the deployment or alert ninety-day cycle in 
order to ensure that civil support skills have been recently exercised and are current with 
statutory and technical requirements and capabilities.  
Since NORTHCOM sponsors these exercises, this pattern of training and 
exercises would allow all CSEFs to become familiar with the DSCA mission, as well as 
the NORTHCOM command and control structure. Additionally, it would allow 
NORTHCOM to familiarize themselves with the different regional leaderships (state, 
local and military) as well as the different unit capabilities and requirements of each 
CSEF. This is of particular importance because the ten CSEFs will use different 
equipment or teams to accomplish the DSCA mission requirements, since they are pulled 
from DoD forces that are predominantly dual-purpose forces. Although CSEF units 
would be identified ahead of time, each CSEF may have units that are equipped 
differently but are intended to accomplish the same mission. In our statutory and legal 
review, we identified that DoD forces are constrained by DoDD 3025.15 restrictions that 
prohibit DoD from procuring or maintaining any supplies, material, or equipment 
exclusively for providing DSCA, unless otherwise directed by the secretary of defense.165 
Therefore, it is essential that DSCA providers train and exercise with a myriad of 
capabilities, since the type of equipment and personnel that respond to a civilian request 
may be different each time it is required. Furthermore, a continued exercise cycle with 
 
164 For specific details on these exercises, see NORTHCOM website at 
http://www.northcom.mil/News/2007/AS07/index.html (Accessed September 25, 2007.  
165 U.S. Department of Defense, Directive 3025.15, Military Assistance to Civil Authorities 
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 18 February 1997), 14 (Under revision; will be re-issued 
under the name Defense Support of Civil Authorities). 
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rotating CSEFs will ensure the maximum amount of DoD forces trained for DSCA 
operations. Additionally, this would serve to resolve the lack of DoD training for civil 
support missions, which plague forces that respond to these requirements.  
This also illustrates why it is important for CSEF forces to be paired with FEMA 
regions. FEMA regions are characterized by different political, cultural, and capability 
requirements and sensitivities. For example, during recent preparations for the potential 
impact of Hurricane Dean in Texas, local authorities attempted to borrow the Louisiana 
aerial medical evacuation plan for implementation in Texas.166 Authorities discovered 
that the Louisiana plan, although very thorough, was tailored for the political and cultural 
sensitivities of the region; it worked because of the population density and the availability 
and type of ports of embarkation in the region. In Texas, authorities found different legal 
requirements for the evacuation of high-risk patients, different cultural barriers to the 
separation of families and love ones, and populations that were more dispersed. 
Additionally, airports were smaller and less capable of supporting large military aircraft 
or civilian contracted airframes that constituted the primary means of mobilization for the 
Louisiana plan. Tailoring military CSEFs to the regions that they will support, and 
mandating recurring training with state and local first responder capabilities in these 
regions, would mitigate the cultural differences across regions, identify particular 
sensitivities and capabilities specific to each region, and allow the continued 
improvement of DoD civil support plans by incorporating lessons learned from the 
recurring exercises.  
The National Guard, under the leadership of Lieutenant General Blum, has 
unveiled a five-year plan for unit rotations to meet the Global War on Terrorism 
requirements. This plan is incorporated into the DoD Global Force Management Plan, 
which has had tremendous success in the past three years. “The end result of these 
processes has proven to be timely allocation of those forces and capabilities necessary to 
execute combatant command missions, timely alignment of forces against future 
requirements, and informed strategic decisions on the risk associated with allocation 
 
166 Personal conversation with the USNORTHCOM Director of Operations, 23–27 August 2007. 
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decisions while eliminating ad hoc assessments.”167 The Global Force Management Plan 
establishes U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) as the lead organization for 
identifying and recommending sourcing options for forces and capabilities to meet 
combatant commander requirements utilizing the same Request for Forces process 
employed in Defense Support of Civil Authorities.168 We learned earlier that JFCOM is 
also in charge of providing the sourcing of units tasked with civil support missions. If 
CSEF requirements are incorporated into this overall Global Force Management Plan the 
twenty-four-month CSEF readiness and preparation cycle could be de-conflicted with 
GWOT deployments and other combatant commander requirements. JFCOM could 
manage the CSEF cycle while de-conflicting other military requirements. Additionally, 
because of the dual-purpose nature of the forces, DSCA training and readiness exercises 
would also benefit unit warfighter training requirements. DoD advocates that the Global 
Force Management plan has been successful because there is a “measurable reduction of 
the time between identification of the requirement by the supported combatant 
commander and receipt of the force in-theater.”169 This is exactly the type of effectiveness 
needed in the Defense Support of Civil Authorities construct. CSEFs can be the tool by 
which JFCOM incorporates the civil support requirements of the combatant commander 
in charge of HLD and HLS, the commander of U.S. Northern Command, thereby 
eliminating the current ad hoc contingency sourcing process that can delay military forces 
and capabilities for up to five days from the time they are requested. 
3.  Command and Control 
As discussed earlier, the RAND report presented four alternatives constructs for 
the command and control (C2) of civil support missions (separate federal and state forces, 
dual status commanders, NORTHCOM in command of forces, and State Joint Force 
Headquarters TAGs in command of forces).  These alternatives are all possibilities 
 
167 Michael Ferriter and Jay Burden, “The Success of Global Force Management and Joint Force 
Providing.” Joint Force Quarterly 44, 1st Quarter 07, 2, ndupress.ndu.edu, 
http://www.oft.osd.mil/library/library_files/article_557_031407%20success%20of%20global%20force%20
management%20and%20joint%20force%20providing.pdf (Accessed August 22, 2007). 
168 Ibid., 2. 
169 Ferriter and Burden, 3. 
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depending on the magnitude of DoD assistance.  The C2 enabler is really not an issue 
with the construct of the CSEF.  Our framework recommended earlier in this chapter that 
the PFO be given the authority to determine what military capabilities the situation 
requires based on the threat or domestic incident and the outcome desired. With the 
CSEF construct providing these military capabilities, the PFO would identify the amount 
and type of capability or support he needs and the units that comprise the CSEF would 
deploy to provide the support. If the support mission required only Title 10 units, then 
NORTHCOM could maintain C2 through the Defense Coordinating Officer or a Joint 
Task Force. If the support consisted of National Guard or reserve forces, the state Joint 
Force Headquarters via the Adjutant Generals could maintain C2.  If a large support 
requirement was required, the best answer might be a dual-status commander in charge of 
a JTF that answers to the commander of NORTHCOM.  
If the validation process is changed, as recommended earlier, to criteria similar to 
that used by the National Strategy for Aviation Security (existing law, desired outcome, 
response capabilities required, asset availability, authority to act), the Principal Federal 
Official and the military commander could use the proposed CSEF framework and would 
have the authority to act under the constraints of current law, to utilize the assets 
available in the CSEF, to enable the response capability required and thereby reach the 
desired outcome by exercising the appropriate C2 model. 
The proposed model does pose one significant challenge to use of National Guard 
forces in a CSEF construct. Currently, National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction 
Combat Support Teams (WMD-CST) and CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Packages 
(CERFP) are being sourced strictly from National Guard forces and equipment. WMD-
CSTs are planned for every state in the country and Congress has authorized seventeen 
CERFP packages for the nation. Under the CSEF model, these capabilities would be 
linked into regional response cells. For example, WMD-CSTs for the states of California, 
Nevada, and Arizona would be linked into a regional response force that coordinates 
efforts with FEMA region IX (see Figure 10). If California had a catastrophic incident 
that required DoD support at the level of a Tier 3 response in accordance with the CJCS 
Standing DSCA EXORD, all three of these WMD-CSTs would be tasked to respond to 
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the catastrophic incident — assuming that region IX was currently on the ninety-day alert 
window. If, for example, it was region VII that was on alert, the WMD-CSTs from 
Kansas, Nebraska, Iowa, and Missouri would respond to the incident. This process allows 
for every region/state in the country to always have a WMD-CST enhanced (more than 
one unit) capability available around the clock. The seventeen CERFPs would fall into 
these regions depending on their geographical location. The major issue with this process 
is that state governors would have to relinquish command and control of the capabilities 
resident in their state for these teams to serve on a regional and national capacity. 
Although the CSEF framework guarantees an alert capability that will be able to respond 
within hours instead of days, state governors must be willing to conform to this process, 
or the POTUS would be forced to federalize these troops to employ them in a different 
state or region in accordance with the authorities in the new modification to the 
Insurrection Act ,or ELRPO.  
The incentives for states to participate in this process are significant. Currently, 
many states may find that units that are part of their WMD-CST or CERFPs packages 
may be deployed in support of warfighter requirements, or have recently returned from 
deployments and are not mission ready. Therefore, they do not have an operational 
capability in this mission set on an alert basis and would have to rely on the current DoD 
contingency process to source these capabilities if needed. With the CSEF model, even if 
the state capabilities are deployed or not available, the state still has a WMD-CST or 
CERFP capability on an alert basis. 
 
Figure 10.   Proposed CSEF Regions to Match FEMA. 170 
 
Clearly, this issue becomes a political decision that will require significant debate 
at the appropriate levels.  It will certainly require further research. However, the 
Command and Control process for the strategic, tactical, and operational control of these 
forces under the CSEF framework can function as described in the previous paragraph.  
The key to the success of a flexible C2 construct is that all options be exercised and 
validated so that, at the time of an incident, the C2 process decision depends on the level 
of response required instead of a political decision. 
4. Framework Complements and Improves Existing Processes 
It is important to develop a DoD civil support system that can be activated and 
function within the construct of existing laws and processes. The CSEF framework 
accomplishes this requirement by working within the boundaries of the Posse Comitatus 
Act.  CSEFs would not be used specifically for law enforcement purposes; they would 
prepare forces to accomplish the intent of the recent changes to the Insurrection Act, or 
Enforcement of the Laws to Restore Public Order, by enabling a structure that 
                                                 
170 Image from Louisiana Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness website 
http://www.loep.state.la.us/femarelated/FEMARegMap.htm (Accessed September 1, 2007). 
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consistently trains National Guard, Reserves, and active duty Title 10 forces for civil 
support missions. Under the CSEF framework, the current Request for Assistance and 
Request for Forces process studied earlier would still be applicable, yet the DoD 
validation and response process would be much faster. The Pre-Scripted Mission 
Assignment process would be improved because the Principal Federal Official would 
already have units identified, sourced, trained, and standing by to accomplish the specific 
pre-scripted mission desired. All fifteen Emergency Support Functions identified in the 
National Response Plan could still enlist assistance from DoD under the CSEF construct. 
Furthermore, the CSEF units could still be employed under the three-tiered process 
identified in the CJCS Standing DSCA EXORD.  The major changes to the EXORD 
would be in the Prepare to Deploy Order timeline process and in the sourcing of DoD 
units. The CSEF framework would require that all the forces in that specific bucket of 
capabilities be prepared to deploy within twelve to eighteen hours (this number is 
subjective; different units will require different timelines based on the nature of their 
mission and their logistical preparations and en-route time). Assuming that the prepare 
order process would take eighteen hours and the en-route time would take six hours, the 
CSEF framework would enable DoD support within twenty-four hours, as opposed to 
spending twenty-four hours in the validation and approval phase, as is currently the case.  
Furthermore, the DoD civil support units would already be identified and sourced, 
eliminating the JS DSCA EXORD restriction that some Tier 2 forces and all Tier 3 forces 
not be sourced before hand.171   
E. AREAS REQUIRING FURTHER RESEARCH/LIMITATIONS TO 
IMPLEMENTATION 
• The proposed framework requires that CSEF be developed into 10 different 
regional buckets of capability that coincide with the 10 FEMA regions.  Based on 
the geographical demographic of DoD capabilities across the nation it might be 
difficult to create 10 different CSEFs with like capabilities. Further research is 
required utilizing the military’s Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS).  
 
171 Department of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Defense Support of Civil Authorities 
Execute Order (Washington, DC: June 2007) 10, 13. 
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DRRS gives military planners and policy makers a real-time, data-driven tool to 
evaluate the readiness and capability of DoD forces to carry out assigned and 
potential missions.172  
 
• The CSEF framework would require a significant amount of NG, Reserve, and 
Title 10 forces.  For this concept to be successful under the current operational 
deployment tempo, state governors would have to relinquish ownership of their 
civil support forces. In return, they would receive the backing of a framework that 
assures their state and region a “24/7 365” DSCA support network that is fully 
trained, equipped, and ready to respond. Nevertheless, the framework would 
necessitate a nationwide campaign to convince and solicit maximum participation 
from all state governments. 
 
• As noted earlier, CSEFs are not effective without reliable airlift support. 
Increased requirements on U.S. Transportation Command and USAF Air Mobility 
Command airlift capabilities would significantly reduce warfighter support. Short 
of generating more airlift capabilities, which would require an extensive timeline, 
DoD should consider creating an In-System select process for National Guard and 
Reserve organic airlift capabilities. This type of airlift was successful in 
mobilizing the majority of the Katrina response forces without the use of the Air 
Mobility Command system.  Furthermore, serious consideration should be given 
to the 2003 Defense Science Board recommendation that the Civil Reserve Air 
Fleet contract be re-negotiated to provide DSCA support. 
 
• The DoD Request for Assistance process is rooted in a series of interagency 
agreements based on reimbursement of funds for services rendered.  The fiscal 
constraints on the DoD budget have undoubtedly been a driving force in DoD’s 
reluctance to plan, program, and budget for civil support missions.  With the 
 
172 Derived from Defense Readiness Reporting System mission statement, http://drrs.org/ (Accessed 
August 1, 2007). 
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CSEF framework, DoD would be responsible for the training and equipping of the 
CSEFs. The states or agencies requiring the CSEF support, however, would still 
be responsible for the reimbursement of the cost of the support. Therefore, the 
fiscal process would become more complex, since the current EMAC construct 
that governs the state-to-state reimbursement process would expand to more states 
and agencies, and costs may increase if CSEF troops are mobilized from a further 
distance. 
 
• Although Chapter IV lauded DoD efforts to improve the effectiveness of DSCA 
operations in recent years, the thesis analysis has highlighted numerous times that 
an effective DSCA framework will require a doctrinal shift in DoD focus. The 
CSEF requires a commitment by DoD to accept the civil support mission as a 
central mission and plan, program, and train to effectively accomplish this central 
mission. Therefore, the CSEF framework will require buy-in from all levels of 
leadership across DoD.    
F. CONCLUSION 
This thesis began by asserting that the federal government’s performance during 
Hurricane Katrina proved that the current DoD framework to support civil authorities is 
slow and cumbersome. President Bush’s suggestion to Congress, that there may be 
certain types of natural disasters or terrorist attacks “so vast and so destructive” that the 
military may be the only institution equipped and trained to respond,173 warrants an 
analysis of situations where DoD resources and capabilities can be used more effectively.  
This analysis has identified and reviewed two distinct philosophies on DoD 
involvement in domestic events. The conclusion was that the statues that govern the 
execution of DoD actions in DSCA operations further obfuscate the matter by 
establishing a myriad of legal requirements that must be met before DoD can take action 
in response to a domestic catastrophic incident. Furthermore, these policies do not pose 
clear and concise responsibilities and roles for DoD in the area of DSCA because they 
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see DoD involvement in civil support as a fallback and failsafe alternative to a civilian 
response. This analysis also supported the philosophical approach that held strong 
reservations about the current DoD framework’s ability to perform effectively in 
domestic operations because of a misunderstanding of the legislation and lack of DoD 
policy that enables a civil support mission.  
Two situational vignettes carved out of the National Planning Scenarios were 
used to demonstrate that the DoD validation and approval process is slowed by policy 
that prohibits DoD from procuring or maintain any supplies, material, or equipment 
exclusively for providing DSCA, unless otherwise directed by the secretary of defense. 
Furthermore, NORTHCOM, the command charged with providing civil support, has no 
legal authority to initiate DSCA operations without the approval of the president or 
SECDEF. These limitations fuel an argument for a change in the current mechanism for 
requesting, validating, and approving the use of DoD assets and capabilities.  
To mitigate this restricted process, DoD has initiated numerous efforts to prepare 
for domestic incidents. The CJCS Standing DSCA EXORD, Pre-Scripted Mission 
Assignments, and CBRNE Consequence Management Response Forces are all prudent 
planning efforts to enable a DoD response to multiple and/or simultaneous events. 
Despite these efforts, this thesis asserts that military forces and capabilities are not 
postured for a timely and effective notification, preparation, deployment and employment 
to a civil support response. Therefore, these efforts are not sufficient to produce an 
effective DoD response that will prevent human suffering, loss of life, and critical 
infrastructure.  
In the end, the overall recommendation developed in this thesis calls on DoD to 
reorganize its force structure to most efficiently support a military response to a domestic 
event. The CSEF framework offers one, if not the best, strategy for maximizing the use of 
DoD capabilities in response to a catastrophic domestic event. The CSEF framework, 
however, requires leadership support for a doctrinal shift.  In this age of terror and  
 
 
173 Gordon, “Hurricane Rita: Bush urges larger role for military,” 4. 
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catastrophic homeland emergencies, DoD’s responsibilities to national security requires a 
positive embrace of civil support as a central mission on par with its traditional 
warfighting readiness obligations. 
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